Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses

CMC Student Scholarship

2019

The Catastrophe Artists: Understanding America’s
Unaccountable Foreign Policy Elite
Samuel Fraser

Recommended Citation
Fraser, Samuel, "The Catastrophe Artists: Understanding America’s Unaccountable Foreign Policy Elite" (2019). CMC Senior Theses.
2158.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2158

This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

Claremont McKenna College

The Catastrophe Artists: Understanding America’s Unaccountable
Foreign Policy Elite

Submitted To
Professor Jennifer Taw

By
Sam Fraser

For
Senior Thesis
Fall 2018 and Spring 2019
April 29, 2019

1

2

3

Table of Contents
Table of Contents

4

Acknowledgements

5

Abstract

6

Introduction: Impunity and the American Elite

8

The Roots of the American Elite

11

The Evolution of the American Elite

13

The Breakdown of Meritocracy

15

What is the foreign policy elite?

23

The Nature of the Foreign Policy Elite

25

The Mechanisms of Elite Impunity

30

The Internal Dynamics of the Elite: Integration and Cohesion

31

Elite-Public Dynamics

44

Elliott Abrams

54

Mr. Abrams Goes to Washington

58

Mr. Abrams Goes to Court-Mandated Community Service

65

Abrams in the Second Bush Administration

70

Abrams Outside of Government

75

Henry Kissinger

81

Kissinger’s Early Life

83

The Successes of Realpolitik

88

The Dark Side of Kissinger’s Realism

94

Henry Kissinger, Honorary Harlem Globetrotter
Conclusion

108
120

A Bipartisan Problem

125

The Opinion-makers

130

Solutions

138

Bibliography

144

4

Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank Professor Jennifer Taw, my adviser and
reader for this project. The idea for this thesis would not have existed without her input,
nor would the paper have taken shape as it did without her guidance. I further thank her
for her patience with my sporadic and delayed approach to the writing process. I am
additionally grateful to Ben Rhodes for giving me some of his thoughts on the issues
addressed in this thesis, and to Professor Mietek Boduszynski for providing helpful
guidance on my case studies.
I would also like to thank my parents, Bill and Janet Fraser, for supporting my
education and enabling me to be here in the first place. I further thank my mother for
providing me with much needed encouragement and prodding midway through the year.
Lastly, I am grateful for my friends here at Claremont McKenna, particularly
Alejandro Sandell, Harrison Chotzen, Jesse Jennings, and Owen Dubeck. They kept me
sane throughout the most exhausting weeks of this process.

5

Abstract
The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was a foreign policy action that violated
international law, was based on false premises, and came to represent a clear and costly
political disaster for the United States and Iraq. Why then, did none of the top
policymakers responsible for the decision to invade face meaningful consequences – be
they professional consequences, or legal ones? Why too have so many of the media
figures who helped sell this war to the American public remained in their prestigious
positions, with massive platforms to influence the American people?
This paper argues that the above groups, referred to as the foreign policy elite or
foreign policy establishment, are granted a general impunity for their actions. It seeks to
explain this condition of elite impunity, and how it operates, through Robert Putnam’s
theory of “elite integration.” It also examines the role of congressional marginalization
and public disengagement in enabling the foreign policy elite to escape accountability.
The subsequent chapters offer case studies of how each of these factors has helped
advance and preserve the careers of two prominent members of the foreign policy elite,
Elliott Abrams and Henry Kissinger. Finally, the conclusion explores further questions on
the matter of elite impunity, and offers some basic steps towards creating a more
accountable foreign policy elite.
Keywords: foreign policy elite, foreign policy establishment, impunity, accountability
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Introduction: Impunity and the American Elite
"In Washington, the very architects of disaster – the pundits who sold the Iraq War, the
prophets of deregulation, the corrupt and discredited lobbyists and merchants of
influence – return time and again, Terminator-like, to the seats of power." – Christopher
Hayes, Twilight of the Elites, 2012.

In July of 2018, President Donald Trump nominated Judge Brett Kavanaugh of
the D.C. Circuit Court to fill the vacancy on the U.S. Supreme Court left by the
retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy. Months later, Kavanaugh’s confirmation was put
in jeopardy after multiple women made detailed and credible allegations that the judge
had sexually assaulted them while intoxicated in high school and college. 1
Beliefs regarding the judge’s guilt and the seriousness of the allegations quickly
divided along partisan lines, and after a limited investigation by the FBI, Republicans
pushed through Kavanaugh’s confirmation despite the accusations, and despite the fact
that the judge appeared to lie numerous times in his testimony to the Senate. 2
A number of left-wing writers pointed out that the non-punishment of Brett
Kavanaugh is representative of a broader phenomenon of elite impunity in American
politics and society. Not only do elites of various stripes typically escape punishment for
many forms of malfeasance, but their defenders actually argue that any kind of

1
Jamelle Bouie, “Brett Kavanaugh Is the Culmination of a Political Movement Devoted to the Status Quo,”
Slate Magazine, September 19, 2018, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/09/brett-kavanaughchristine-blasey-ford-elite-power.html.
2
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Kavanaugh Is Sworn In After Close Confirmation Vote in Senate,” The New York
Times, October 7, 2018, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brett-kavanaughsupreme-court.html.
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punishment for their actions, usually characterized as “mistakes,” would be detrimental to
the country as a whole. To punish these accomplished men (usually) would not only be
unfair to them, as they have spent their whole lives climbing America’s meritocratic
ladder and demonstrating the sort of virtues celebrated by the elite, but it would be unfair
to the public, who would be deprived of the unique and irreplaceable skills these
individuals offer.
Writing in Slate, Jamelle Bouie contrasts these defenses with the treatment less
fortunate Americans might face for similar actions. “Calls for leniency and understanding
for the judge before courts of power and opinion that may determine his career sit
uncomfortably next to the treatment of young black Americans at the hands of police, or
of unauthorized immigrants at the hands of border authorities.” 3
In Vox, Matthew Yglesias notes that arguments for Kavanaugh’s indisputable
legal credentials are made “despite never in his life having been involved in anything
successful.” 4 Instead, his career has been comprised of a series of fiascos – including
work for independent counsel Ken Starr, whose investigation led to the failed
impeachment proceedings against Bill Clinton, a clerkship for Alex Kozinski, an appeals
court judge who was recently brought down by a sexual harassment scandal of his own,
and a role as a senior staffer in the Bush administration. In this last position, he was
revealed to have misled Congress on the administration’s handling of emails stolen from
Democratic Committee staff. 5

3

Bouie, “Brett Kavanaugh Is the Culmination of a Political Movement Devoted to the Status Quo.”
Matthew Yglesias, “Kavanaugh and Trump Are Part of a Larger Crisis of Elite Accountability in
America,” Vox, September 21, 2018, https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/9/21/17876832/kavanaugh-trump-crisis-elite-accountability.
5
Ibid.
4
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In light of this, along with the allegations of sexual assault against him, it would
have seemingly been prudent for the Trump administration to withdraw Kavanaugh’s
nomination and replace him with another staunchly conservative judge. Instead, however,
the nomination became a proxy war over elite privilege at large. As Zach Carter wrote in
The Huffington Post, the “highest pleasure” of the American elite “is the knowledge
shared among its members that they live above democratic accountability, that their
words and deeds are not constrained by the broader political community the way the
words and deeds of mere citizens can be.” 6
In the last two decades, this privilege has been exercised conspicuously. As stated
by Bouie, “The leaders who produced the catastrophic failures of the 2000s–from the Iraq
War and an illegal torture regime to the financial crisis and the near-collapse of the global
economy—remain elites in good standing, with leading roles in political and economic
life.” 7
How has it come to pass that in a nation founded on liberty, justice, and equality
before the law, political and economic elites could produce such failure and indulge in
criminal behavior seemingly without consequence? While this current crisis of elite
accountability is profoundly modern, it too has its roots in the nation’s founding, and the
notion of a ruling class characterized by higher talent and virtue.

6

Zach Carter, “Brett Kavanaugh Is A Poster Child For The American Aristocracy,” HuffPost, September
19, 2018, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/brett-kavanaugh-americanaristocracy_n_5ba2cc8de4b0375f8f99c5d2
7
Bouie, “Brett Kavanaugh Is the Culmination of a Political Movement Devoted to the Status Quo.”
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The Roots of the American Elite
When America’s founders broke away from the British Empire and formed a new
state, they drew their primary inspiration not from ancient democracies, but from the
Roman Republic. 8 Democracy, they believed, in empowering the masses, would lead to
factionalism and anarchy. 9 In Federalist 10, James Madison explained how a republic
would differ from this mass rule: government would be delegated to a number of
representatives, who would be defined by their “wisdom” and by their “patriotism and
love of justice.” 10
These representatives would constitute a “natural aristocracy,” a notion endorsed
even by Thomas Jefferson, who is considered one of the most democratically-inclined of
the founders. 11 Jefferson believed that such an aristocracy should be actively cultivated,
in contrast to John Adams, who believed it would rise inevitably, but both supported its
rule. 12
Thus, the founders accepted an inequality of wealth and power resembling, if not
exactly, that of the patricians and the plebeians of Rome. This was premised on the
notion that the ruling class would have different and better values than the masses.
The virtues of the ruling class were not, however, exercised equally towards all.
Roman patricians were to treat and govern plebeians well, but not as peers. Furthermore,

8

Mortimer Newlin Stead Sellers, “Classical Influences on the American Founding Fathers,” in The
Classical Tradition, ed. Anthony Grafton, Glenn Most, and Salvatore Settis (Rochester, NY: Harvard,
2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1437142.
9
Ibid.
10
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, “Federalist 10,” in The Federalist Papers, ed.
Lawrence Goldman (Oxford ; Oxford University Press, 2008), 48.
11
Philip J. Costopoulos, “Jefferson, Adams, and the Natural Aristocracy,” First Things, May 1990,
https://www.firstthings.com/article/1990/05/jefferson-adams-and-the-natural-aristocracy.
12
Ibid.
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the virtue of Roman consuls was not considered tarnished by how terribly they treated
those on the receiving end of their republic’s foreign policy, such as Carthaginians or
Gauls. Accordingly, many of the founders could count themselves as honorable and
virtuous despite the fact that they owned and abused slaves. Thus, republican virtue is
tiered, with the highest decency and civility reserved for one’s aristocratic peers, and the
lowest for those excluded from citizenship.
This natural aristocracy was not to be unrestrained, however. The founders
emphasized that rulers must be equally subject to the rule of law. In Federalist 71,
Alexander Hamilton argued that the president must be “subordinate to the rule of law,”
while in Federalist 57, James Madison argued that without equality before the law,
“every government degenerates into tyranny.” 13 Unambiguously, the first president of the
United States, George Washington, declared that “the executive branch of this
government never has, nor will suffer, while I preside, any improper conduct of its
officers to escape with impunity.” 14
Thus, in conjunction with regular elections and checks-and-balances, equality
before the law would theoretically ensure the continual replenishment of the political elite
with capable, law-abiding, and honorable individuals, preserving liberty and justice
despite inequalities of wealth and power.

13

Glenn Greenwald. With Liberty and Justice for Some: How the Law is Used to Destroy Equality and
Protect the Powerful. (New York: Picador, 2011), 8.
14
Greenwald, 9.
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The Evolution of the American Elite
The American aristocracy has changed a great deal since the time of the nation’s
founding. As Jefferson and Adams hoped, and as early scholars of American society like
Alexis de Tocqueville recognized, a European-style aristocracy of lineage never took
hold. However, those who did come to assume control of America’s political, economic,
and military might have steadily grown in power.
In his 1956 book The Power Elite, the sociologist C. Wright Mills documented
the rise and development of the American elite from the Revolution to the early Cold
War. He divided the elite’s development over this time period into five epochs based on
changes in the nation’s structure of power. In the first such period, from the Revolution
through the administration of John Adams, “the social and economic, the political and the
military institutions were more or less unified in a simple and direct way” as “the
individual men of these several elites moved easily from one role to another at the top of
each of the major institutional orders.” 15 In the following epoch, from the presidency of
Jefferson to Lincoln, the economic order broadened and became “ascendant” as the
nation’s territory grew, but the elite in command of these orders was more loosely
overlapping, with decentralized power. 16 With the Gilded Age, the economic elite
through vast expansion of their wealth and naked corruption subordinated the political
elite and public power in general. This trend was reversed somewhat with the reassertion
of political power in the Progressive era, but Mills marks his fourth epoch with the New
Deal. 17 The new deal, in Mills description, “did not reverse the political and economic

15

C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 269.
Mills, 271.
17
Mills, 272.
16
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relations of the third era” but created “within the political arena… competing centers of
power that challenged those of the corporate directors.” 18
From the Second World War through the beginning of the Cold War, Mills
identified the beginning of a fifth epoch. This era brought the ascent of Mills’ “power
elite,” those “political, economic, and military circles which as an intricate set of
overlapping cliques share decisions having at least national consequences.” 19 “In so far as
national events are decided,” said Mills, “the power elite are those who decide them.” 20
In the American power structure’s fifth epoch, the “tendency of business and
government to become more intricately and deeply involved with each other… reached a
new point of explicitness,” as in many cases, men of the corporate world assumed the
reins of state power. 21 Furthermore, with an enlarged executive branch and an entrenched
war economy, military men gained a lasting and “decisive political relevance.” 22 These
developments occurred, Mills says, as “the focus of elite attention” shifted from domestic
to international problems. 23 The United States, long a regional hegemon that involved
itself only reluctantly in broader global conflict, had become the stronger of the world’s
two superpowers, with the ability to shape a world order and influence events around the
globe. The American elite, commanding enlarged and centralized institutions of power,
had with nuclear weapons gained even the ability to wipe out life on earth. 24

18

Mills, 272.
Mills, 18.
20
Ibid.
21
Mills, 274.
22
Mills, 275.
23
Ibid.
24
Mills, 7.
19
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After Mills’ death in 1962, the role of the American elite within the country and
the world continued to change. As Mills might have predicted, the elite soon faced a selfinflicted crisis of public confidence with the disastrous Vietnam War, the economic
stagnation of the 1970s, and the fall of the Nixon administration due to the Watergate
scandal. As journalist Christopher Hayes notes in his book Twilight of the Elites, this
crisis of authority inspired polling companies like Gallup and the General Social Survey
to begin periodically surveying Americans on their trust in major institutions such as “big
business, public schools, the Supreme Court, and about a dozen others.” 25
Combined with the social movements of the 1960s, this led to a reshaping of
America’s power elite along the lines of meritocracy. The major institutions that made up
this power structure, such as corporations, government agencies, and Ivy League
colleges, remained in place, but were no longer as solely-dominated by the Anglo-Saxon
company and military men described by Mills. In the principle of natural aristocracy,
they brought into their ranks people from a more diverse set of geographical, racial, and
religious backgrounds, as well as women and later, LGBT people. 26

The Breakdown of Meritocracy
Meritocracy is in principle a system in which rank, power, and wealth are
theoretically distributed to those who through work and training have demonstrated the
most merit to wield them. In The Twilight of the Elites, Hayes explains that a functioning
meritocracy must operate on two principles: the Principle of Difference and the Principle

25

Christopher Hayes. The Twilight of the Elites: America After Meritocracy. (New York: Crown
Publishers, 2012) 10.
26
Hayes, 22.
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of Mobility. 27 The Principle of Difference states that different people have widely
varying abilities and that society should be organized along those lines, with the most
difficult, complex, and rewarding tasks falling to the most able people. The Principle of
Mobility states that meritocracy requires “a continuous competitive selection process that
ensures that success is rewarded and failure punished.” 28 That is, even once an individual
has demonstrated the aptitude to gain a position of power, they must continue to do so
throughout their career in order to retain that position. In a true meritocracy, rank cannot
be fixed for lifetime and its advantages cannot be inherited by the next generation. 29
Such a continuous competitive selection process, however, proves difficult to
sustain. Hayes cites the work of German social theorist Robert Michels, whose study of
organizations led him to identify what he called “The Iron Law of Oligarchy.” 30 In short,
this law posits than in any organization of a significant size, a “permanent, full-time cadre
of leadership” will have to be selected to make everyday decisions. 31 Eventually, no
matter how nominally committed the organization is to democracy, this leadership class
will develop its own interests distinct from those of membership at large, and will have
the means of power to “manipulate the opinion of the masses” and become independent
of their control, creating what is functionally an oligarchy. 32
Hayes asserts that a similar outcome is an inevitable product of meritocracy.
Dubbing this “the Iron Law of Meritocracy,” he says that in any meritocratic system, the
vital process of mobility will eventually break down. “Eventually,” he states, “the
27

Hayes, 56.
Hayes, 57.
29
Ibid.
30
Hayes, 56.
31
Hayes, 55.
32
Ibid.
28

16

inequality produced by a meritocratic system will grow large enough to subvert the
mechanisms of mobility. Unequal outcomes make equal opportunity impossible.” 33 The
result of this is that Jefferson’s “natural aristocracy” comes to resemble something closer
to a classical aristocracy – and in keeping with this, the United States in the 21st century
has seen wealth inequality reach record levels while social mobility has dropped
significantly. 34
Through this process, the elite does not only become wealthier and more
entrenched, but it is also thoroughly corrupted. Hayes describes the kind of elite that such
a broken meritocracy might produce as “a group of hyper-educated, ambitious
overachievers who enjoyed tremendous monetary rewards as well as unparalleled
political power and prestige, and yet who managed to insulate themselves from sanction,
competition, and accountability.” 35 Members of this elite class would “face no actual
sanctions for failing at their duties or succumbing to the temptations of corruption” and it
would “reflexively protect its worst members.” 36
A thorough examination of the American elite and its record over the past several
decades suggests that exactly this has occurred. The new meritocracy did not dispense
with the structural inequalities of wealth and power that defined Mills’ power elite. If
anything, it exacerbated them, as it conferred, in the words of Hayes, “vastly unequal
compensation and resources” on those determined to be ambitious and talented” and

33

Hayes, 57.
Alana Semuels, “Poor at 20, Poor for Life,” The Atlantic, July 14, 2016,
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/social-mobility-america/491240/.
35
Hayes, 64.
36
Hayes, 64.
34
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“facilitated accelerating and extreme economic inequality of a scope and scale unseen
since the last Gilded Age.” 37
Aided by a series of crises in the early 21st century, this meritocratic elite has
overseen declines in public trust in institutions to well below their levels following
Watergate and the Vietnam War. For some institutions, like big business and organized
labor, decline in trust since the 1970s has been slight – in large part because public
confidence in each was quite low already. 38
Other institutions saw more drastic drops in public confidence. According to
Gallup, the percentage of Americans expressing “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of
confidence in the Supreme Court declined from 45 to 37 percent between 1973 and 2018,
while trust in Congress fell from 42 percent to a dismal 11 percent. Trust in the
presidency fell from 52 to 37 percent, and in newspapers, from 39 to 23 percent. Trust in
television news, which Gallup began monitoring in 1991, fell from 46 to 20 percent. 39
Only a handful of institutions saw increases in public confidence during this
period – and notably, all three were institutions of state coercion. Trust in the criminal
justice system remains low, but increased from 17 percent in 1993 to 22 percent in 2018,
while the police saw their public trust increase from 52 to 54 percent over this period.
The military, meanwhile, has cemented its position as America’s most trusted institution,
with public confidence in the armed forces growing from 58 percent in 1975 to 74
percent today. 40

37

Hayes, 22.
“Confidence in Institutions,” Gallup, accessed April 26, 2019,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/Confidence-Institutions.aspx.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
38
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Of course, complete blame for this crisis of confidence cannot be placed at the
feet of the elite. It is possible that these low levels of trust are not caused by the elite’s
actual performance. One explanation favored by many in the elite is the rise of the 24hour news cycle and the proliferation of alternative media sources on the Internet. As
Hayes says, “the twenty-four-hour news cycle and the frenetic intensity of the Internet eat
away at people’s faith by sensationalizing mistakes and insinuating nefarious motives.” 41
This fragmented and polarized media landscape may highlight negative news, giving the
public the impression that things are worse than they really are.
However, this is not a sufficient explanation for the crisis. Whatever the corrosive
effects of the modern media ecosystem may be, the elite has provided more than enough
fodder for negativity. In the first decade of the 21st century, the political and economic
elite set up, through actions both misguided and malicious, a financial crisis that caused
the worst global recession since the 1930s. Furthermore, the political elite allowed the
worst and highest offenders in this crisis to escape any meaningful consequences. 42
Some of the most flagrant failings of the U.S. elite, however, have come in the
realm of foreign policy. In the 1970s, the disaster of the Vietnam War exposed the
fallibility and recklessness of America’s foreign policy establishment, while the Church
Committee exposed the overreach and abuses of the U.S. intelligence apparatus. 43 The
collapse of the Soviet Union and America’s “victory” in the Cold War in 1991 briefly

41

Hayes, 11.
William D. Cohan, “How Wall Street’s Bankers Stayed Out of Jail,” The Atlantic, August 10, 2015,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/how-wall-streets-bankers-stayed-out-ofjail/399368/.
43
Thomas Young, “40 Years Ago, Church Committee Investigated Americans Spying on Americans,”
Brookings, November 30, 2001, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2015/05/06/40-years-agochurch-committee-investigated-americans-spying-on-americans/.
42
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appeared to vindicate U.S. foreign policy. However, this momentary sense of triumph
was shattered by the terrorist attacks of September 11th, and perhaps even more so by the
U.S. invasion of Iraq shortly after.
In 2003, the United States and several allies invaded Iraq against much opposition
among the international community, on the basis that the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein
was building weapons of mass destruction with which he could threaten the world. 44 The
invasion, according to the Bush administration and its backers in the media and foreign
policy intelligentsia, would depose the cruel and reckless Hussein and build a stable
democracy in Iraq, which in turn would help promote peace and democracy throughout
the Middle East at large. 45
Of course, only the first of these goals was achieved in any meaningful way.
Hussein was ousted in short order, and later tried and executed, but the supposed WMDs
– biological, chemical, or nuclear – never materialized. Instead, it was revealed that the
Bush administration had manipulated questionable intelligence on the alleged Iraqi
weapons program to make their case for the war seem stronger. Despite quick victory
over Saddam’s forces, the U.S. coalition was soon battling a sectarian insurgency that
would keep its forces fighting in the country until 2011. The war also helped birth a new
international terror threat in the Islamic State, empowered Iran, and over seven years
since it officially ended, has not produced a functioning pluralistic democracy in Iraq. 46

44
“The Iraq War,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed April 26, 2019,
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war.
45
Dan Murphy, “Iraq War: Predictions Made, and Results,” Christian Science Monitor, December 22,
2011, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/1222/Iraq-war-Predictions-made-and-results.
46
Ibid.
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Over eight years of war, somewhere around 461,000 Iraqi civilians were killed,
with other estimates ranging higher or lower. 47 At the same time, the war cost the lives of
4,410 U.S. soldiers while leaving countless others wounded or suffering from
psychological effects such as PTSD. 48 All this came at a cost of about $1.7 trillion to U.S.
taxpayers. 49
The greatest failure of the Iraq War, however, was the fact that it was allowed to
happen at all. Of course, the Bush administration bears the brunt of responsibility, but
opposition politicians, prominent members of the foreign policy establishment, and the
media largely failed to challenge the administration’s case for the war or to present
meaningful opposition.
The Senate voted to authorize the invasion of Iraq by a margin of 77 to 22 votes,
with 60 percent of the Democratic caucus voting in favor. 50 This included leading figures
such as Hillary Clinton, while outside government, “prominent Democratic foreign policy
experts like Richard Holbrooke and James Steinberg were open supporters as well.” 51 In
think tanks like the Brookings Institution, where support for the war was not monolithic,
writings and panels in the lead-up to the invasion were nonetheless dominated by war
supporters like Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack. 52

47

“Iraq War ‘Left Half a Million Dead,’” BBC News, October 16, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-24547256.
48
“Casualty Status as of 10 a.m. EDT April 25, 2019,” U.S. Department of Defense, accessed April 26,
2019, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Casualty-Status/.
49
Daniel Trotta, “Iraq War Costs U.S. More than $2 Trillion: Study,” Reuters, March 14, 2013,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-war-anniversary-idUSBRE92D0PG20130314.
50
Hayes, 110.
51
Walt, 110.
52
Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, The Silence of the Rational Center: Why American Foreign Policy is
Failing (New York, Basic Books, 2007) 107.
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The picture in the news media was no better. Analyzing over one thousand news
reports from ABC, NBC, and CBS in the lead-up to the war, one study found that “Bush
administration officials were the most frequently quoted sources, the voices of anti-war
groups and oppositions Democrats were barely audible, and the overall thrust of coverage
favored a pro-war perspective.” 53
Worse yet, there has been minimal effort among these elites to reckon with these
failures. While success in foreign policy is subjective, it is near-undeniable that the Iraq
War’s supporters inside and out of the Bush administration were guilty of pushing a bad
policy. Furthermore, some officials in the Bush administration were almost certainly
guilty of actual crimes, related to both the war in Iraq and the War on Terror at large. Yet
few in either category have faced meaningful consequences for these actions. No highlevel officials were criminally sanctioned for the Bush administration’s torture regime,
and prominent supporters of the war have mostly been rewarded with sinecures in the
media and think tanks, or with jobs in the Trump administration. 54
The Iraq War is only a recent and prominent example of the foreign policy elite’s
failures, and the success of its members in evading both legal sanctions for criminal
policies and professional consequences for merely bad policies. Instead, Iraq is only
representative of a longstanding fallibility and lack of accountability among foreign
policy elites, dating back at least to the beginning of the Cold War, but reaching a new
height of flagrancy in the mass-media era.

53

Danny Hayes and Matt Guardino, “Whose Views Made the News? Media Coverage and the March to
War in Iraq,” Political Communication 27, no. 1 (January 29, 2010): 59–87,
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584600903502615.
54
Nancy Cook, “‘Bushies’ Creep into Trump’s Administration,” POLITICO, December 23, 2018,
https://politi.co/2QQW6wV.
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By examining the U.S. foreign policy elite – its internal mechanisms, how its
members are selected and promoted, and how they are insulated from accountability – we
can better understand the failures and impunity of the American elite at large.

What is the foreign policy elite?
The pundits and policymakers who planned, sold, and executed the Iraq War
were, and for the most part remain, members of a select group of individuals known as
the foreign policy elite, or alternatively, the foreign policy establishment. Foreign policy
elites are the people and institutions that occupy the highest positions among what
international relations scholar Stephen Walt calls “the foreign policy community.”
In his book The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the
Decline of US Primacy, Walt defines the foreign policy community as “individuals and
organizations that actively engage on a regular basis with issues of international
affairs.” 55 This includes people within the policymaking organs of government such as
the State Department, Department of Defense, and National Security Council, as well as
the people and institutions outside of government that work to influence foreign policy
and shape public opinion on it. 56 The latter group includes fellows at foreign policy think
tanks, prominent scholars of international relations, members of influential interest
groups, and pundit-journalists who regularly comment on foreign policy issues. 57
The elite distinguishes itself from this broader community through its power.
Elites either exercise power directly, have influence over it, or exist in close proximity to

55

Stephen Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018) 95.
Walt, 96.
57
Ibid.
56
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it. The foreign policy elite is the inner ring of the foreign policy community; it is a tighter
network of individuals in the same field who reside at or near the top of the institutions
they occupy. Thus, a deputy or assistant secretary of state is a member of the foreign
policy elite where an average Foreign Service officer is merely a member of the greater
foreign policy community. Elites are also characterized by their tendency to partake in a
“revolving door” mechanism. Members of the elite often cycle between roles in
government, think tank fellowships, academia, and punditry. The influence and
reputation accrued in one of these positions allows an individual to secure another. 58
Indeed, most members of the foreign policy elite discussed in this paper will have
occupied roles in multiple sectors of the foreign policy community – including, most
importantly, at least one stint in policymaking.
Those members of the elite who have not held a policymaking role justify their
position through their proximity to and influence over high-level policymakers. Some,
like Max Boot, have mostly worked in the think tank world but would have likely
received a policymaking role had the presidential candidate to whom they were attached
not lost an election. 59 Other characters, most commonly career journalists-turned-pundits,
simply have a big platform and access to top policymakers that allow them to influence
elite opinion.
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The Nature of the Foreign Policy Elite
One of the most salient characteristics of the foreign policy elite is that it is an
interconnected network of individuals and institutions. Each sector of the foreign policy
elite serves a different function. Government institutions and the individuals who
populate them wield direct power, crafting and implementing policy. Institutions outside
government, like think tanks, the media, and to an extent, academia, wield indirect power
by influencing policymaking and policing the boundaries of acceptable policy views.
This notion is supported empirically by a 2007 study by Mark Souva and David Rohde,
which demonstrated that cleavages between Republican and Democratic opinion-makers
strongly correlated with more partisan congressional votes on foreign policy issues. 60
Walt asserts that the media, too “plays a key role in shaping what elites and publics know
and believe about the world at large and about U.S. foreign policy itself” while think
tanks “conduct research, testify to Congress and other government agencies, and appear
frequently as media commentators,” often for the purpose of promoting a certain
ideological direction in policy. 61 Additionally, according to Walt, think tanks “provide
entry level opportunities for young policy wonks seeking to make their way into
government positions, and… provide sinecures for former government officials,
including those seeking to return to public service at a later date.” 62
Academia fills a somewhat similar role to that of think tanks. For one, universities
and professors “train the people who end up working in government, media, and the think
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tank world.” 63 Thus, academia shapes the thinking of members of the foreign policy elite
and provides them with a somewhat uniform background of elite education. Indeed, a
2008 study by Joshua Busby and Jonathan Monten found that in both the Cold War and
post-Cold War eras, a high proportion of high-level foreign policymakers were educated
at Ivy League universities. Among top executive branch officials and the heads of foreign
policy committees in Congress during the Cold War, 46.41 percent boasted Ivy Leaguebackgrounds, while among their post-Cold War counterparts, the figure was 42.19
percent. 64
Like the think tank world, academia can also provide a starting point for those
hoping to get into foreign policymaking, or a landing pad for those who already have. As
Walt says, “the faculty ranks at most schools of public policy or international affairs are
filled with people who have combined scholarly careers with periods of public service.” 65
The individuals who fill the different sectors of this elite remain part of one
coherent community. As Walt says of the foreign policy elite, “Many of its leading
members know one another and participate in overlapping activities and organizations…
and prominent figures within this community often work for several different
organizations over the course of a career, sometimes simultaneously.” 66
Members of the foreign policy elite often take advantage of a “revolving door”
mechanism, highlighted both Walt and by Mills as a characteristic of the American elite
at large. For one example, Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign
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Relations, began his career at the Department of Defense before moving to the State
Department and then to the White House as National Security Council Senior Director
for Near East and South Asian Affairs. After the administration of George H.W. Bush, he
held a visiting professorship at Hamilton College before becoming Director of Foreign
Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Haass returned to government as the Director
of Policy Planning at the State Department from 2001 to 2003, after which he finally
became president of the Council on Foreign Relations. 67 Others may follow a reverse
order, beginning in academia and eventually landing in a government role, but gaining
increasingly prestigious positions all along the way.
Connections between members of the foreign policy elite can be formal, through
shared membership in organizations, or informal, through personal relationships. One
example of the former highlighted by Walt is the Aspen Strategy Group, “a bipartisan
forum to explore the preeminent foreign policy challenges the United States faces.” 68 Its
members include “former government officials like Madeleine Albright, Brent
Scowcroft, Nicholas Burns, Thomas Donilon, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Robert
Zoellick; journalists like CNN’s Fareed Zakaria… think tanks presidents like Richard
Haass of the Council on Foreign Relations… and academics like Eliot Cohen of Johns
Hopkins.” 69 Forums like this are supposed to “explore” and “debate” often controversial
issues of foreign policy, but too often collect elites who broadly agree with one another.
Walt points to the World Affairs Councils of America National Conference, which
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assembles “speakers from… mainstream think tanks,” prominent journalists, and former
government officials, who tend to be similarly “dedicated internationalists.” 70 Typically
absent from these events are prominent critics of U.S. foreign policy.
Personal relationships between elites are also extensive, with some even related
by blood or by marriage. There are a few notable examples of “power couples” – spouses
who both hold influential positions in the foreign policy world. 71 Robert Kagan, cofounder of the neoconservative think tank Project for a New American Century, provides
a good example of this. His wife, Victoria Nuland, is a former assistant secretary of state
and current CEO of the Center for a New American Security, while his father Donald and
brother Frederick are also neoconservative intellectuals. 72
Walt notes how important these relationships are for someone who wants to
ascend into the ranks of the foreign policy elite and stay there. Contrary to many
professions which require a formal path of training and certification, “aspiring foreign
policy gurus need only establish a close relationship with a successful politician or
acquire a solid reputation among established figures within some part of the existing
community.” 73 To draw in new talent, the foreign policy establishment offers internships
and fellowships through which “new entrants are recruited, groomed, and promoted
based on judgments made by established figures.” 74 This makes foreign policy elites the
gatekeepers of the foreign policy community; their approval is a prerequisite for
ascending its ranks. One’s ability to enter the foreign policy elite, says scholar Janine
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Wedel, “depends not just on quick study, but on connecting and forging networks, on
conferences and cross-pollination among politics, business, and media.”
Once an individual ascends to the ranks of the foreign policy elite, with the
network of relationships and institutional positions that implies, it is difficult and rare for
them to be removed. Walt recounts numerous cases of members of this elite who
repeatedly demonstrated bad judgment and dishonesty, or produced catastrophic policy
failures. Some of those he describes were responsible for severe crimes, like torture and
illegal mass surveillance. Yet in each case, the individuals in question faced no
consequences (or extremely light ones) for these actions, and instead continued to be
rewarded with ever-more prestigious positions and larger platforms. 75
Members of the foreign policy elite are granted the same impunity that is enjoyed
by the American elite at large. They consistently avoid both professional accountability
for policy failures and legal accountability for outright crimes. This paper seeks to
explain how, and why, this occurs. The next chapter will offer theoretical explanations
for the mechanisms that facilitate impunity for the foreign policy elite, while the
following two will examine impunity through the careers of two of the elite’s most
prominent and notorious members. Lastly, the conclusion will explore further questions
on the matter of elite impunity, and will offer some basic steps toward bringing
accountability to the foreign policy elite.
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The Mechanisms of Elite Impunity
"To participate in this aristocracy is to enjoy the comforts of fine living ― calm
neighborhoods, well-engineered automobiles, intellectually engaging art. But its highest
pleasure is the knowledge shared among its members that they live above democratic
accountability, that their words and deeds are not constrained by the broader political
community the way the words and deeds of mere citizens can be." – Zach Carter in The
Huffington Post, 2018.

The central question of this paper is how members of America’s foreign policy
elite so often avoid accountability for both failings of policy and criminal acts. This
impunity has created a foreign policy elite whose most prominent members include men
and women with careers marked primarily by the advocacy for or implementation of
disastrous policies, and in some cases, by instances of flagrant law-breaking.
I seek to explain this problem primarily through the paradigm known as elite
theory, especially through Robert Putnam’s 1976 work The Comparative Study of
Political Elites. 76 Putnam’s arguments expand and improve upon those of earlier elite
theorists like Robert Michels and C. Wright Mills, whose contributions were described in
the previous chapter. Elite theory offers a diverse set of explanations for elite power, and
differing normative assumptions about the benefits and drawbacks posed by political
elites. However, it generally rests on one core tenet: that “due to their strategic positions
and resources under their control, elites – that is, small groups of ‘persons who are able,
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by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, to affect
political outcomes regularly and substantially’ – have the power that the majority of
people or non-elites lack, and they make systematic use of their power in both democratic
and non-democratic polities.” 77
There are two broad structural mechanisms which protect the U.S. foreign policy
elite from accountability. The first is the integration or cohesion of this sector of the elite,
which I describe along the dimensions laid out by Putnam. The second is the elite’s
relationship with the American mass public, which is defined primarily by elite influence
over public opinion, and by public disengagement from esoteric issues of foreign policy.

The Internal Dynamics of the Elite: Integration and Cohesion
In his study of political elites, Robert Putnam defines elite power as “the
probability of influencing the policies and activities of the state.” 78 In any society, this
power exists in a stratified system, with those closest to the top typically wielding the
most of it. Putnam identifies six strata of power, but for the purposes of this paper, the top
two – “proximate decision makers” and “influentials” – shall be considered the elite.
Proximate decision makers are “those individuals directly involved in national policy
making,” while influentials are “those who actively try to influence the opinions either of
the national decision makers, the public as a whole or large parts of it, or the other
opinion makers.” 79
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“Elite integration” describes the degree of unity of this elite in terms of the
common characteristics, views, and motives of its members. This type of unity was
deemed by Mills to be a defining feature of the elite. Mills states: “Insofar as the power
elite is composed of men of similar origin and education, insofar as their careers and their
styles of life are similar, there are psychological and social bases for their unity, resting
upon the fact that they are of similar social type and leading to the fact of their easy
intermingling.” 80
Putnam seeks to make an empirical examination of this unity through six
“dimensions of integration.” These are social homogeneity, common recruitment
patterns, extensive personal interaction, value consensus, group solidarity, and
institutional context.81 An elite that fulfills each of these dimensions to a significant
degree may be considered highly integrated or cohesive.
Social homogeneity is highest in nations with hereditary ruling classes, which are
increasingly rare in the modern era. However, Putnam nonetheless found that “in nearly
every political system… the upper social strata supply a quite disproportionate share of
the political elite.” 82 This finding was supported more recently by John Higley, who
contended that “occupants of national elite positions are distinguished by their privileged
social origins.” 83 Beyond class, social homogeneity entails common traits of “education,
ethnicity, religion, geographic origin, and sex.” 84 Thus, a fitting example of a socially
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homogeneous elite is the old “Northeastern Elite” of U.S. politics, made up primarily of
white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant men from the country’s northeast coast. 85
Putnam’s second dimension of integration is common recruitment patterns. In
elite groups where social homogeneity has declined, patterns of recruitment fill a key role
in socializing would-be members into a cohesive group. Educational institutions like elite
universities “play a key role in sifting and channeling aspirants” and “create a pool of
eligibles” who can join the elite. 86 From this pool, individuals can be selected into the
elite through different means. Most important is what Putnam calls an “intramural
selectorate” in which a narrow group of pre-existing elite gatekeepers chooses or appoints
new members of the elite. 87 This groups becomes “the effective constituency to which the
elite member will respond” and according to Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone, these
“persons who have control over the pathways to membership in the political elite tend to
naturally favor persons of similar ideology, status, and background.” 88 Prewitt and Stone
further assert that these processes filter out “those whose views are bizarre,” or in other
words, outside the accepted boundaries of elite opinion. 89
According to Trygve Gulbrandsen, through educational institutions and the
organizational positions elites hold, “they are moulded to certain standards of work,
norms, work habits and even basic views characteristic of the organization” which in turn
“promotes integration of professional attitudes, and probably also fosters similar
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ideological orientations.” 90 In this way, rising elites are “socialized to adopt the basic
values and orientations of "their" institution or organization.” 91 Thus, by the time he
reaches an elite position, “a leader's views are influenced less by the social circumstance
of his youth than by adult roles and affiliations." 92
An important aspect of elite recruitment is the degree to which elites can hold
multiple top positions simultaneously, or can change among “top posts in diverse sectors”
in immediate succession of one another. 93 This is characteristic of what Putnam calls
“permeable recruitment channels,” whereby individuals ascend the ranks of power by
moving back and forth between different sectors of the elite, rather than following a
single closed path as one might do in advancing through a bureaucracy. 94
Such “sequential overlap” enhances elite cohesion, as elites in one sector may be
inclined to accommodate the desires of elites in another in order to improve their career
prospects in the latter sector. Past positions may also shape how a member of the elite
acts in their present role, as each experience shapes how the individual views the world
and what interests they prioritize. 95
Social interaction marks a third dimension of integration, defined by “networks of
personal communication, friendship, and influence” among elites. 96 Putnam cites James
Rosenau, who asserted that “the greater the interaction among diverse types of leaders,
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the more they will comprehend each other’s attitudes and thus the readier they will be to
join together in support of a particular policy.” 97
Empirical studies of the Venezuelan and Yugoslavian elites confirmed the
contention of elite theorists that such bonds of social interaction increase in density as
one moves up the social hierarchy. 98 In the United States, these highest circles were
additionally shown by John Higley to be “more active… in policy advisory capacities,
such as testifying before Congress and serving on federal commissions, and… more
visible in the mass media, as measured by the frequency with which they gave TV, radio
or magazine interviews, presented lectures and wrote articles and books.” 99
Social interaction can be facilitated by other dimensions of elite integration, like
educational background and recruitment channels. It is also facilitated by particular social
institutions that exist primarily for this purpose, such as “the Georgetown cocktail
circuit” and the Council on Foreign Relations. 100 This interaction can also take place in a
more removed manner, through the pages of elite media outlets such as the New York
Times and the Washington Post, which are contributed to and read by much of the
political elite. 101
These interactions between elites occur in spite of disagreements they may hold
among them. In a study of elites in stable democracies, including the United States, John
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Higley found that “elites with sharply opposing views nevertheless interact extensively
with each other.” 102
Putnam identifies as the most important dimension of elite cohesion “value
consensus” or agreement on “what is to be done.” 103 This is not to say that members of an
elite agree on all or most matters of policy. Rather, as asserted by Kenneth Prewitt and
Alan Stone, political elites in Western democracies agree on “codes of conduct.” 104 This
might entail “the politics of bargaining and compromise, tolerance for political
opponents, and a willingness to abide by… electoral decisions.” 105 Putnam asserts that
this commitment to the norms of a system reflects “the gratification” that the system
gives to the elites. “Leaders are more likely to agree on the rules of the game,” Putnam
says, “because it is fundamentally their game.” 106 As with the density of social
interactions, support for systemic political norms rises as one approaches the top of the
elite. Putnam cites Giuseppe Di Palma, who states that “the acceptance and practice of
the rules for conflict accommodation are most widespread at the upper level of the
elite.” 107
This is not to say however, that elite consensus is limited to agreement over
procedural norms. Indeed, many elite theorists assert that elites are also united “on
overriding issues of international affairs and political economy.” 108 Furthermore, Peter
Bachrach asserts that these procedural norms “cannot realistically be dissociated from the
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political context in which they operate and the substantive values and interests which
they affect” – meaning, essentially, that consensus on procedure will at least to some
degree affect views on matters of policy. 109
The final dimensions of elite integration identified by Putnam are solidarity and
institutional context. Solidarity is, put simply, the affinity elites feel for one another by
virtue of their shared elite status. Putnam emphasizes the notion that “nothing brings
elites together so much as mutual respect which flows from sharing in the confraternity of
power.” 110 Mills calls this a “class consciousness,” asserting that members of the elite
feel a level of responsibility towards each other, and that “psychological affinities…
make it possible for them to say of another: He is, of course, one of us.” 111 Thus, “the
mark of a unified elite,” Putnam says, “is not the absence of disagreement, but rather
sufficient mutual trust.” 112
Lastly, elite integration requires social and institutional context. As stated
previously, elites derive their power from institutional positions, and their networked
connections and social interactions are also facilitated by the institutions they occupy in
common. Institutional context enhances the common interests of elites. Putnam says: “If
the institutions whose command posts the elite occupy have overlapping interests, the
elite incumbents may be led to take complementary actions.” 113 Putnam also states that
“functional specialization and organizational loyalties force leaders to view national
problems from divergent perspectives.” 114 For institutions and elites occupying the same
109

Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967). 53.
Putnam, 121.
111
Mills, 283.
112
Putnam, 122.
113
Putnam, 122.
114
Ibid.
110

37

sector, however – such as foreign policy or finance – perspectives and interests are driven
by similar imperatives, and therefore lead to greater unity and cohesion.
Additionally, Putnam addresses the normative question behind elite integration
– that is, is an integrated elite essential to stable democracy, or does it necessarily result
in unaccountable oligarchy? Those favoring the latter perspective stress that “an
integrated elite is likely to be oligarchic and that democracy can survive only where
leaders are socially heterogeneous and politically divided.” 115 As Putnam recognizes,
however, these states are not totally mutually exclusive. It could be that elite integration
produces both stability and oligarchy, and some theorists argue for a “golden mean” or a
point of integration that balances between the two conditions. 116
But where does the U.S. foreign policy elite fall along this theoretical continuum?
Unfortunately, there is a lack of research on the membership of the U.S. foreign policy
elite that could empirically measure how it scores on each dimension of integration.
However, qualitative examinations of the foreign policy elite show each of these
dimensions present in different ways, and at each turn, these conditions seem to thwart
accountability and point towards oligarchy.
Recall Stephen Walt’s descriptions of the foreign policy elite from the previous
chapter. The modern foreign policy elite may be less socially homogeneous than the
northeastern establishment, but its fulfilment of Putnam’s other “dimensions of
integration” is striking. Walt states the foreign policy elite “is a community, especially at
the highest levels” and that “many of its leading members know one another and
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participate in overlapping activities and organizations.” 117 Prominent members of the
elite are “connected by personal association,” including friendship, familial relations, and
marriage. 118 Moreover, these interactions take place within an institutional context,
namely, in think tanks or networks like the Aspen Strategy Group. 119
Walt also describes the foreign policy elite in terms resembling Putnam’s
“patterns of recruitment.” Elite universities, fellowships, and internships serve to
“identify, recruit, socialize, and advance the careers of young people eager for a career in
this world.” 120 These entrants are “recruited, groomed, and promoted based on judgments
made by established figures.” 121 Advancement requires only “a close relationship with a
successful politician… or a solid reputation among established figures within some part
of the existing community. 122 Elites also display “sequential overlap” in their
organizational positions, often working “for several different organizations over the
course of a career, sometimes simultaneously.” 123
Perhaps most importantly to both Walt and Putnam’s analysis, the U.S. foreign
policy elite displays strong value consensus. Walt asserts that the foreign policy
community “creates powerful incentives for conformity.” He quotes Edward Luce of the
Financial Times, who notes that in government today, “it is better to be wrong in good
company than right and alone.” 124 This is aggravated by the institutions of the foreign
policy world, including think tanks and membership organizations, of which the most
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prominent and best funded are united in the embrace of U.S. hegemony and active
interventionism. 125
Such incentives for conformity help explain the foreign policy elite’s nearconsensus in favor of war leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. While disagreements
among elites certainly do occur, they “take place within a broader climate of opinion that
sees U.S. primacy and active global leadership as good for America and good for the
world.” 126
The cohesion of the foreign policy elite helps insulate its members from both
professional and legal accountability. For a member of this elite, professional
advancement depends on one’s reputation and relationships among his colleagues and
superiors. In the case that a policymaker is accused of or charged with crimes in the
course of his duties, whether or not he faces legal sanction is dependent on the decisions
of high officials in the U.S. Department of Justice, and ultimately, on the president. In
any case, the integrated state in which these elites exist disincentives accountability.
Elites who maintain good relationships and reputations continue to find professional
success despite their actual records, and presidents usually choose to shield their foreign
policy officials from accountability or to forgo investigations into foreign policy-related
crimes under their predecessors.
The United States is a representative democracy, however, and in theory, if elites
will not hold each other accountable, they should be accountable to the people. For one,
Congress, as the people’s representatives in Washington, can investigate the actions of
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executive branch officials, or place limits on their activities. 127 Congress is vested with
the constitutional power to “provide for the common defense,” “to regulate commerce
with foreign nations,” “to raise and support armies,” and “to declare war.” 128 The Senate
has the power to approve treaties and confirm or reject nominees to key foreign policy
posts in the executive branch. 129 Congress controls appropriations, giving it the ability to
fund its own foreign policy priorities and defund the president’s. 130 Lastly, Congress can
“hold hearings, conduct investigations, and debate issues” to put pressure on the
executive branch and shape public opinion on foreign policy. 131
However, the fact that these powers are delineated does not mean they will be
exercised. As James Lindsay explains, Congress is especially likely to defer to the
president on foreign policy during times of war and intense activity abroad. During wars,
members of Congress recognize the legitimate need for strong presidential leadership and
decisive action while also adopting a dangerous level of deference to the president for
fear of being called unpatriotic or accused of damaging the U.S. cause. 132 With the
exception of the 1990s, the U.S. has been in a continuous war posture since the Second
World War, as the Cold War of the 20th century was replaced by the War on Terror in
the 21st. 133
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While congressional influence over foreign policy has ebbed and flowed during
this time, it has been consistently decreasing in the long-term. 134 James Goldgeier and
Elizabeth Saunders write that since the Cold War, “Congress’ oversight of U.S. foreign
policy has declined markedly” and that Senate committees charged with foreign policy
and national security oversight “have held substantially fewer hearings… over time,
resulting in far less supervision of major foreign policy endeavors.” 135
This decrease in oversight has been driven by party polarization and a decline in
congressional foreign policy expertise. According to Goldgeier and Saunders,
polarization undermines oversight because periods of unified government yield “extreme
deference to the president.” 136 Meaningful congressional supervision only occurs when
one or both branches of congress are controlled by the opposition party, which can use
oversight to score political points. 137 Reflexive opposition in Congress in turn encourages
the president to actively circumvent the legislature in foreign policy, as President Obama
did in pursuing a nuclear deal with Iran as an executive agreement rather than a treaty
requiring Senate ratification. 138 Furthermore, Congress’ capacity to conduct oversight
and give input on foreign affairs has been eroded by its loss of foreign policy expertise.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in particular once provided a locus for seasoned
veterans of foreign affairs who commanded the respect of presidents, the public, and
other members of Congress, and were thus better positioned to provide oversight and
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challenge the executive branch on foreign policy. 139 Due in part to higher turnover in
Congress and an increase in committee posts held by each member, such foreign policy
leaders are rarer in today’s legislature. 140
In the executive branch, foreign policymaking has been further insulated from
Congress by the increased importance of the National Security Council. Established in
1947, the Council was originally conceived as a body to coordinate policy between the
Senate-confirmed heads of cabinet agencies like the departments of State and Defense. 141
However, beginning in the John F. Kennedy administration and accelerating under
President Richard Nixon, the Council increasingly took over the role of day-to-day
policymaking and execution. Further, since the 1990s, the Council staff has grown in size
from about 50 to 400 members. 142 Neither the head of the Council nor its top staffers are
subject to Senate confirmation, and all are protected from congressional oversight by
executive privilege. This means that foreign policy decisions are increasingly
concentrated in a body over whose composition Congress has no input, and whose
members have no obligation to appear before congressional hearings. 143
In some cases, members of Congress have been perfectly happy to keep their
fingerprints off foreign policy decisions. By allowing presidents to pursue military
actions and other foreign policies without congressional approval, legislators avoid
having to answer for their votes on these matters during re-election. This dynamic was
shown during the Obama administration with congressional refusals to vote on military
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action in Syria and Libya, and during the Trump administration with congressional
reluctance to demand a say over the imposition of trade tariffs. 144
The marginalization of Congress is bad for the effectiveness of U.S. foreign
policy, because, as Lindsay states, potential congressional opposition “encourages
presidents to think through their policy proposals more carefully.” 145 Its absence, on the
other hand, raises the likelihood that executive branch officials will act “unwisely” or
“overreach.” 146 It also undermines accountability, as the lack of oversight hearings and
investigations into the president’s foreign policies makes it more likely that potential
malfeasance by his officials will escape public scrutiny.
Beyond Congress, however, the president is supposed to be directly accountable
to the people, as he, unlike the foreign policy officials who serve under him, must face reelection (and in his second term, he has a strong interest in seeing the election of a new
president from his own party). If a president and his subordinates make bad foreign
policy decisions or commit crimes, the president should theoretically be voted out and
replaced by one from the opposing party who promises to do better. 147 Why, despite this
mechanism, does popular accountability remain elusive in the foreign policy world?

Elite-Public Dynamics
There are a number of reasons why foreign policy elites are, for the most part, not
held accountable by the public. In his article entitled “A Democratic Foreign Policy,”
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Eric Alterman asserts that “the foreign policy elite and the American people have
different and often conflicting interests and problems.” 148 The elite, Alterman says, “are
ideologically committed to free trade and widespread military intervention” while “the
public believes that the United States should protect American jobs and mind its own
business whenever possible.” 149
However, according to Alterman, the establishment is extremely comfortable
“setting the terms” of foreign policy debate, and enacting its policies with minimal
interference from below.” 150 There are a number of features of the American public as it
relates to foreign policy that enable this. The most salient factors are the following: first,
the public is broadly disengaged from foreign policy issues. Second, where the mass
public is paying attention to foreign policy, their opinions tend to follow rather than lead
the opinions of elites. Lastly, the inaccessible or classified nature of crucial foreign policy
information, along with the psychological justifications provided by patriotism and
national security, encourage the public to accept what elites say and do in matters of
foreign policy.
It is taken as something of a given that the American public usually does not pay
close attention to foreign affairs. Political scientist Gabriel Almond said, “Americans
tend to exhaust their emotional and intellectual energies in private pursuits… On
questions… such as foreign policy, they tend to react in formless and plastic moods
which undergo frequent alteration.” 151 Writing in 1976, Robert Putnam asserted that
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“where voters are inattentive, as is usually true in foreign affairs, for example, latitude for
elite discretion is wide.” 152
In 1996, Eugene Wittkopf and Charles Kegley wrote that “most Americans are
uninterested in and ill-informed about foreign affairs.” 153 Even at the height of the Gulf
War, “only 36 percent of the American people said that they were very interested in
following news about other countries” and just over half said that they were “very
interested in news of U.S. relations with other countries.” 154 Wittkopf and Kegley cite
Doris Graber, who stated that Americans “do not seek out foreign policy news.” 155 When
presented with foreign policy news, as they were with an hour long interview of Soviet
premier Mikhail Gorbachev by NBC News in 1987, members of the public are sometimes
inclined to tune it out. In this instance, “only 15 percent of the national audience tuned
in” and “half of the viewers who at that time ordinarily watch NBC’s entertainment
programs switched to other networks.” 156
This mostly holds true today. In a 2017 survey by Pew Research Center found
that while 60 percent of Americans could recall that the United Kingdom was in the
process of leaving the European Union, only 44 percent could correctly identify the U.S.
Secretary of State at the time, Rex Tillerson, and only 37 percent could identify the
president of France, Emmanuel Macron. 157 A 2013 Pew study found that only 40 percent
of Americans could identify Egypt when the country was highlighted on a map of the
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Middle East, while a 2010 study found that only 41 percent could accurately describe the
state of India-Pakistan relations as hostile and a dismal 15 percent could identify the thenBritish prime minister as David Cameron. 158 While this is not an exhaustive survey of
foreign policy topics, it is indicative of a general lack of public knowledge of important
actors and issues in foreign affairs.
Where Americans are paying attention to foreign policy, scholarship has found
that their views are more shaped by cues from elite opinion leaders than in response to
events and unmediated information. This is the conclusion of Adam Berinsky’s study
entitled “Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict.” Berinsky
showed that in the case of the Iraq War, public opinion followed what is called “elite cue
theory” – which states in short that “the balance of elite discourse influences levels of
public support for war.” 159 Under this set of assumptions, “when elites come to a
common interpretation of a political reality, the public gives them great latitude,” but
when “prominent political actors take divergent stands on the wisdom of intervention, the
public divides as well.” 160 Citizens use the opinions expressed by elites with whom they
share ideological affinity as a “reference point” and form their own opinions around these
cues. 161
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In his survey, Berinsky found that most Americans could not correctly state the
number of U.S. war deaths in Iraq to that point, and thus that they could not be accurately
forming opinions around those figures. Furthermore, he found that respondents’ support
for the war was not significantly affected when they were told actual casualty statistics,
even if they had vastly over or underestimated deaths before. 162 Instead, he found that
support and opposition were most strongly affected by partisanship and each individual’s
degree of knowledge about the war. Strong Democrats opposed the war more as their
information levels increased, while strong Republicans supported the war more with
more information. 163
Berinsky’s findings are consistent with the “cascade model” of opinion flow
described by Robert Putnam. Putnam describes a system in which information and
opinion typically trickle downwards from elites to the masses. 164 The cascade model
divides a society into four levels, from highest to lowest influence: the political and
socioeconomic elite, the mass media, opinion leaders, and the mass public. 165 Putnam
acknowledges that “none of these levels is likely to be eternally homogenous,” that “in
most societies, information flows through multiple channels” and that “there is
occasionally some capillary movement of information and opinion upward.” 166 As a
general rule, however, he asserts that “information and persuasion flow more freely
within each level than between levels and more easily downward than upward.” 167
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With information and opinion flowing mostly from the elite to the masses, it is
difficult for the masses to exercise direct or even indirect influence over elite decisionmaking. Instead, in Putnam’s model, most popular influence over the elite comes from
the “rule of anticipated reactions.” 168 This rule states that powerful actors will try to
anticipate how key constituencies will react to a particular decision, and that they will
modify their decision to elicit the most favorable reaction possible. 169 For example, the
president of the United States might base a foreign policy decision on how he expects it
to be received by key constituencies in Congress and the public. In such an instance,
neither party was consulted or actively influenced the decision in any way, but instead
exercised what Putnam calls “implicit power” over it. 170
Implicit power is thus most significant when the public is especially attentive or
reactive to a particular issue, as it depends on the potential of a serious backlash to elite
decision-making. If such a backlash can be consistently kept at bay, the public’s implicit
power is minimized. Beyond public inattention, there are a number of other factors that
keep the U.S. public acquiescent to elite foreign policy decisions.
Stephen Walt has described means by which elites sell what he deems “a failing
foreign policy” to the American public. 171 This is accomplished primarily by inflating
threats, exaggerating the benefits of certain policies, and concealing their costs. 172 Each
of these measures is made more effective by the asymmetry of information between the
elite and the public. As Walt says, “vested interests within the government and the
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broader foreign policy establishment have significant advantages in shaping what the
public knows about international politics and foreign policy.” 173 Eric Alterman notes in
“A Democratic Foreign Policy” that policymakers can manipulate public opinion by
keeping key information classified. 174 Policymakers can then manipulate opinion further
by selectively leaking some classified information to the media and the public. Walt
describes how such a strategy was carried out by the Bush administration in the run-up to
the Iraq War, as Bush officials engaged in “a well-orchestrated campaign of leaks and
false statements” to inflate the threats posed by the regime of Saddam Hussein and to
create the impression that a U.S. invasion was a dire necessity. 175
These tactics are also helpful in exaggerating the benefits and concealing the costs
of policies, as policymakers and the media can play up successes while downplaying,
omitting, or covering up failures and other negative information.
When it comes to concealing policies’ costs however, the elite is also aided by the
growing fact of “social distance” between the consequences of America’s foreign policy
and the American public at large. As Christopher Hayes describes in Twilight of the
Elites, decision-makers must be “connected or proximate to the consequences of their
decisions” or they will be deprived of proper feedback and unable “to make course
corrections.” 176 “In a democracy,” Hayes says, “elections are the ultimate feedback.” 177
But it is difficult for the public to provide this feedback if they are also, generally
speaking, distant from the consequences of a policy.
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For the United States, in some issues of foreign policy the public is almost by
definition insulated from most consequences. This is particularly true of war and security
policy, especially given that for over a century, all of America’s wars have taken place
abroad. Thus, those most closely affected by U.S. security policy are citizens of foreign
nations and U.S. military personnel. The former, of course, have no influence over U.S.
policy, while the latter group has increasingly come to represent a narrow band of the
U.S. public that is more distant from the levers of political power. As Walt notes, since
the implementation of an all-volunteer military at the end of the Vietnam War, “only a
small proportion of American society is directly affected when… wars go badly.” 178
Fewer than 2 percent of fighting-age Americans serve in the armed forces, and these
personnel and their families bear the brunt of the deaths, injuries, and afflictions like
PTSD that America’s recent wars have caused. 179 Furthermore, while previous wars have
“imposed some level of civilian sacrifice through rationing, higher taxes, or both”
America’s wars since 9/11 have been primarily financed by borrowing. 180 This means
that the U.S. can wage war without materially affecting the lives of the vast majority of
its citizens, greatly reducing the likelihood of a severe public backlash.
Often, of course, members of the public do get information that suggests that U.S.
policy may be wrongheaded, harmful, or even illegal. A 2013 study by Barbara Sutton
and Kari Norgaard examined how Americans process negative information about U.S.
foreign policy, especially torture and human rights violations carried out by the U.S.
government. Sutton and Norgaard emphasized that “knowledge about human rights
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abuses at the hands of U.S. officials has been available in the mainstream media, and not
just in obscure sources,” but found that “the ideology of patriotism and national security
provided some interviewees with compelling tools to minimize, normalize, or justify
human rights violations.” 181 Such subjects “exhibited a reluctance to acknowledge or
condemn violations of human rights by U.S. officials, particularly under the
administration they supported,” and would instead deflect to human rights abuses carried
out by and in other countries. 182
Even interviewees who were more critical of the government still to some degree
processed abuses through euphemism and accepted official explanations for rights
violations, such as the blame directed at "a few bad apples who committed abuses at Abu
Ghraib,” which excuses higher officials and the overall thrust of U.S. policy in the War
on Terror. 183 The researchers also highlight the usage of terms like “collateral damage”
and “enhanced interrogation techniques” as serving “to legitimate disturbing dimensions
of foreign policy.” 184
Such practices and modes of thinking help explain why in the United States there
has not been, in Sutton and Norgaard’s terms, “greater public demand for governmental
accountability when state officials perpetrate, authorize, or condone abuse.” 185 It is not
the case, however, that the American people have never been in favor of accountability
for crimes committed in the course of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, as Glenn Greenwald
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notes in his book With Liberty and Justice for Some, a CNN poll before the 2006 midterm
elections found 57 percent of respondents in favor of investigations into the conduct of
Bush administration officials over the previous six years. 186 After the election of Barack
Obama to the presidency, a Washington Post/ABC News poll found that 50 percent of
Americans “said that the Obama administration should investigate whether the Bush
administration’s treatment of detainees was illegal” and a USA Today poll found that
almost two-thirds of Americans supported investigations into both the Bush
administration’s torture program and the warrantless wiretapping of U.S. citizens. 187
Public support for such investigations only eroded after it “became clear that not only
Republicans but also President Obama and the Democratic leadership opposed any
inquiries into Bush-era lawbreaking” – a development consistent with the contention of
elite cue theory that “when elites come to a common interpretation of a political reality,
the public gives them great latitude.” 188
Thus, the public may be prone to inattention towards foreign policy,
predominantly guided by elite opinion, and susceptible to practices that help excuse and
minimize wrongdoing by the foreign policy elite, but they are not reflexively opposed to
accountability. Indeed, the election of Barack Obama, and to a lesser extent, that of
Donald Trump, can be seen as a rebuke of the foreign policy establishment. 189 However,
when the elite has been steadfast and cohesive is resisting public desires for
accountability, such desires have quickly passed.
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Elliott Abrams
''This snake's hard to kill.'' – Admiral William J. Crowe on Elliott Abrams, 1989.

In January 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo named Elliott Abrams, a
longtime stalwart of the neoconservative foreign policy community, as the Trump
administration’s “special envoy” for Venezuela, where the U.S. is seeking to oust the
leftist president Nicolas Maduro in favor of an opposition leader and internationallyrecognized “interim president.” 190 Pompeo stated that Abrams “will have responsibility
for all things related to our efforts to restore democracy” in Venezuela, and that “Elliott’s
passion for the rights and liberties of all peoples makes him a perfect fit and a valuable
and timely addition” to this project. 191
An examination of Elliott Abrams’ actual record as a policymaker, however, calls
Pompeo’s assertions, and perhaps also U.S. aims in Venezuela, into question. In fact,
Abrams’ career has been marked by his support for utterly disastrous policies and
ignominious abuses of human rights, most notably in Central America but also in the
Middle East. Moreover, Abrams in 1991 pleaded guilty to two charges of misleading
Congress on information related to the Iran-Contra scandal, in which members of the
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Reagan administration provided military aid to the Nicaraguan “Contra” rebels in
violation of U.S. law. 192
In a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing in February 2019, Representative
Ilhan Omar (D-MN) aired these concerns, saying:
Mr. Abrams, in 1991 you pleaded guilty to two counts of withholding information
from Congress regarding the Iran-Contra affair, for which you were later
pardoned by President George H.W. Bush. I fail to understand why members of
this committee or the American people should find any testimony you give today
to be truthful.
Omar went on to note that Abrams “dismissed as ‘communist propaganda’ reports
about the massacre of El Mozote in which more than 800 civilians, including children as
young as 2 years old, were brutally murdered by U.S.-trained troops.” 193 She then asked:
“You later said the U.S. policy in El Salvador was a ‘fabulous achievement.’ … Do you
think that massacre was a ‘fabulous achievement?” 194
Abrams refused to answer, calling the line of questioning “ridiculous.” 195 What
ensued among the political commentariat and foreign policy elite was an impressive
display of wagon-circling as others leapt to Abrams’ defense.
On Twitter, Jay Nordlinger of National Review said, of Omar, that “someone
ought to have given her a clue who Elliott Abrams is. The guy has been championing
freedom and human rights his entire life (and taking unholy sh** for it from the illiberal
Left and Right).” 196 Washington Post columnist and Council on Foreign Relations Fellow
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Max Boot added the following: “Disgraceful ad hominem attacks by @IlhanMN on my
@CFR_org colleague Elliott Abrams. She doesn't seem to realize he is a leading advocate
of human rights and democracy--not a promoter of genocide! More evidence of the loony
left I caution Democrats about.” 197
Nominally liberal foreign policy experts were quick to lend bipartisan credibility
to Abrams’ defense. Kelly Magsamen, Vice President of the Center for American
Progress, said in a since-deleted Tweet: “I worked for Elliott Abrams as a civil servant.
He is a fierce advocate for human rights and democracy. Yes, he made serious
professional mistakes and was held accountable. I’m a liberal but I’m also fair. We all
have a lot of work to do together in Venezuela. We share goals.” 198
She was joined by Dave Harden, a former Assistant Administrator for the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), who added: “I was a career FSO
[Foreign Service Officer] and later Obama appointee, Elliott Abrams was a kind,
thoughtful, non-partisan mentor. Let's try to see the best – rather than the worst – in
people.” 199 This was co-signed by Nicholas Burns, an ambassador under President Bill
Clinton and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs for President George W. Bush.
Burns said: “Elliott Abrams is a devoted public servant who has contributed much of his
professional life to our country. It’s time to build bridges in America and not tear people
down.” 200
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These arguments share a common vocabulary and points of reference. For one,
Harden, Magsamen, and Boot note that they know Abrams personally and like him, or
that he has been personally nice to them. Boot states this even more plainly in an
interview with The New Yorker. In explaining why he came to Abrams’ defense, Boot
says: “I know Elliott. He has been a colleague of mine at the Council on Foreign
Relations, and I think that he is a very smart person. I think he is basically a good person
and he is somebody who I don’t see as terribly ideological.” 201
Here several of Robert Putnam’s “dimensions of elite integration” are on stark
display. In rallying to Abrams’ defense, these other members of the foreign policy elite
are making a clear show of group solidarity. To explain this solidarity, they cite the
extensive personal interaction they have had with Abrams. This personal interaction
seems intended to bolster their credibility as authorities on Abrams’ character.
Additionally, however, it diverts the conversation from Abrams’ policy record to his
personal qualities and how he treats his peers, a wholly unrelated subject.
Their statements also reveal shared institutional context – several of these
individuals have at times worked with or for Abrams. For Boot, this was at the Council
on Foreign Relations, where they are both senior fellows, while for Harden and
Magsamen, this was at the State Department. 202 Lastly, there is a nod to value consensus
with Magsamen’s assertion that “we share goals” and with the repeated contention that
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Elliott Abrams is a champion of democracy and human rights, a notion that will be
addressed further later in this chapter.
Such a display of wagon-circling, or “group solidarity” is not an aberration in the
world of the foreign policy elite. Indeed, it is likely the reason that Abrams still has any
foreign policy career to speak of. These peculiar mechanisms of the foreign policy elite
have sustained Abrams’ career for decades despite several potentially career-ending
episodes.

Mr. Abrams Goes to Washington
As stated in his biography on the Council on Foreign Relations website, Elliott
Abrams attained the sort of thoroughly prestigious education common to members of the
foreign policy elite, attending Harvard College, the London School of Economics, and
Harvard Law School. 203 After two years of corporate law, Abrams joined the staff of
Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA), a foreign policy hardliner who provided an early
ideological home to what became the neoconservative movement. 204 He went on to work
for Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), eventually becoming his chief of staff. By
the 1980 presidential campaign, Abrams found himself disillusioned with the Democratic
Party, describing it as “wedded to a foreign policy that I could not accept.” 205 Thus,
Abrams worked on Ronald Reagan’s presidential campaign, and proceeded to be hired as
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs in the new
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administration. 206 Later, Abrams was moved to the position of Assistant Secretary of
State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, after the previous nominee for the
role, in Abrams words, “had to withdraw his name after running into a Senate buzz
saw.” 207 Abrams does not name the man, who was in fact Ernest W. Lefever, and the
“buzz saw” Abrams refers to was the revelation by Lefever’s two brothers that he
believed black people to be “inferior, intellectually speaking.” 208
It was in this position and his next, as Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs, that Abrams conducted his most controversial work. The day before he
assumed the role of assistant secretary for human rights, the Atlacatl Battalion, a U.S.trained unit of the Salvadoran military, massacred nearly 1,000 men, women, and
children in and around the village of El Mozote. In the process, the soldiers also
committed mass rapes (including of children) and other indescribable acts of brutality. 209
This also happened to come just before the Reagan administration was required to certify
whether the Salvadoran army was improving its conduct on human rights, a condition of
military aid to the country. 210
Elliott Abrams testified to Congress that the massacre was “being significantly
misused, at the very best, by the guerillas” and suggested that the timing of the publicity
around the massacre, being just before the certification requirement, was suspicious. 211
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Abrams and other administration officials continued to make these assertions despite
investigations by U.S. embassy officials, as well as the New York Times and Washington
Post, which strongly indicated a massacre had occurred.
Abrams continuously misled Congress on the progress of human rights in El
Salvador. In 1982, he told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that several hundred
Salvadoran officers had been “dismissed from the Armed Forces… or jailed” for terrorist
activity or human rights violations, while a cable from the U.S. embassy in San Salvador
sent that same month reported only 12 cases of Salvadoran officers facing discipline for
human rights abuses. 212 Abrams also denied that the U.S. government knew who was
participating in and supporting right wing death squads in El Salvador, while at the same
time the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported that “a number of prominent
Salvadorans have supported, directed or engaged in death squad activities” including
“officials in the civilian government, representatives of the private sector organizations,
and various individuals associated with the traditional oligarchy of that country.” 213
Abrams additionally covered up the U.S. government’s knowledge that the right wing
Salvadoran politician Roberto D’Aubuisson was responsible for the 1980 assassination of
Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero, saying “Anybody who thinks you’re going to find a
cable that says that Roberto D’Aubuisson murdered the archbishop is a fool.” 214 In truth,
one 1980 cable from the U.S. embassy in El Salvador referred to D’Aubuisson as “the
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leader of the Romero plot” while another from the following year claimed that he chaired
the meeting in which the murder was planned. 215
Ultimately, the civil war in El Salvador claimed around 75,000 lives, and a U.N.backed truth commission found that 85 percent of this violence was carried out by the
Salvadoran military and its associated death squads. 216
In Guatemala, where “civil war” had been raging since 1960, and would
eventually claim 200,000 lives, Abrams repeatedly gave cover to military governments
on human rights issues. Pressing for arms shipments to the Guatemalan military, Abrams
credited the military dictatorship of Efrain Rios Montt with “considerable progress” on
human rights. 217 He added that under Rios Montt, “there has been a tremendous change,
especially in the attitude of the government toward the Indian population.” 218 Decades
later, Rios Montt was convicted of genocide against Guatemala’s Ixil Maya
population. 219 In 1984, Abrams praised the regime of Oscar Mejia Victores, saying that
the dictator had “continued a large number of the human rights improvements that Rios
Montt began.” Mejia was also eventually prosecuted in Guatemala for crimes against
humanity, but was ruled unfit to stand trial after suffering a stroke. 220 Abrams justified
these obvious distortions by suggesting that they were necessary in order to have
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continued “influence over the behavior of the Guatemalan government and the
Guatemalan military.” 221
Abrams’ most notorious actions in this period relate to the Reagan
administration’s policies towards the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Central to these
policies were the Contras, a guerilla force composed primarily of former officials and
soldiers from the dictatorial regime of Anastasio Somoza, which the Sandinistas had
overthrown. 222 The Contra forces, which were rather impotent without significant U.S.
support, were originally conceived, according to Dario Moreno in his book U.S. Policy in
Central America, “as a pressure tactic to compel the Sandinistas to stop their arms
shipment to Salvadoran guerillas and to prevent Nicaragua from joining the Soviet
bloc.” 223 Under a cohort of hardline Reagan officials including Abrams, however, this
policy shifted towards one of ousting the Sandinista government entirely. 224 Abrams
desired an even more aggressive policy. After the successful U.S. invasion of Grenada in
1983, he advocated for a similar invasion of Nicaragua to overthrow the Sandinistas,
though this was not undertaken. 225
Much like the U.S.-backed governments of El Salvador and Guatemala, the
Contras were guilty of shocking human rights abuses. In just one instance, a large group
of Contra fighters ambushed a truck carrying coffee-pickers in rural Nicaragua. They
fired upon the truck, killing “twenty-one civilians, including a mother and her 5 year old
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child” before setting the truck on fire. 226 Such acts were not just aberrations caused by
rogue elements. In fact, a CIA manual produced for the Contras, entitled “Psychological
Operations and Guerilla Warfare,” advised fighters on how to employ the “selective use
of violence for propagandistic effects.” 227 Abrams cannot claim the role of a passive
bystander to the Contras’ tactics. In his book Undue Process, he describes his
bureaucratic infighting with Alan Fiers at the CIA over “who would really, in the most
intense and longest-fought contest of all, control the Contras?” 228 This suggests, provided
that Abrams had any success in this contest, that he had at least a measure of
responsibility for the Contras’ actions.
These policies eventually led to the Iran-Contra affair, a covert operation in which
Reagan officials illegally sold weapons to Iran at inflated prices and diverted the
revenues from these sales towards funding the Contra rebels. 229 Abrams’ role in the
Contra side of this equation was significant. Most notably, it included a strange episode
in which he, with the authorization of the Secretary of State, solicited funding for the
Contras from the Sultan of Brunei. 230 Acting under the codename “Mr. Kenilworth,”
Abrams met with the Foreign Minister of Brunei to secure this donation. Because of a
clerical error, however, Abrams provided an incorrect bank routing number to Brunei,
causing the funds to be deposited in the wrong Swiss bank account. 231 Thus, the Contras
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never received the money and the government of Brunei had to publically seek to recover
its donation. 232
The Reagan administration’s Nicaragua policy “ended in ruin” as the “Sandinistas
continued to consolidate power successfully and the Contras suffered both military and
political defeat.” 233 For this, Abrams blamed Congress for blocking some of the
administration’s efforts to support the Contras. During the administration of George H.W.
Bush, however, with the U.S. no longer sabotaging a Central American-led peace
process, the Sandinistas were successfully induced to open their regime and hold free
elections. 234
The policies pushed by Abrams elsewhere in Central America, beyond their
ethical merits, were also of dubious success. As recently as this year, Abrams has called
the Reagan administration’s policies in El Salvador “a fabulous achievement,” saying
“from the day President Duarte was elected in a free election, to this day, El Salvador has
been a democracy.” 235
It is difficult to accept that the election of Napoleon Duarte was truly “free”
however, when a significant portion of El Salvador’s population was at the time subject
to repression and periodic massacres. Furthermore, while El Salvador and Guatemala are
now electoral democracies, both countries still face severe social problems resulting from
the U.S. policies of the 1980s. 236 In the 2010s, the so-called “Northern Triangle”
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countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador became some of the largest sources
of unauthorized immigrants and asylum seekers arriving at the U.S. southern border. 237
This echoes what happened during the civil wars that took place in these countries
in the 1980s. From El Salvador in particular, tens of thousands fled to the United States
for refuge during that time period. When in the 1990s, President Bill Clinton allowed the
“temporary protected status” of Salvadorans to expire, thousands of young men with no
prospects were forced back into Central America from the U.S., coming to form the core
of the transnational gangs that have driven these countries’ homicide rates to among the
highest in the world. 238 It is worth noting that in Nicaragua, where the Reagan
administration’s nightmare scenario of a leftist revolutionary government came to pass,
the murder rate is among the lowest in the Western Hemisphere, and the number of
refugees that have fled from Nicaragua to the U.S. is correspondingly lower. 239

Mr. Abrams Goes to Court-Mandated Community Service
At the height of the Iran-Contra scandal, the Justice Department had appointed a
special prosecutor, Lawrence Walsh, to head the Office of the Independent Counsel
investigating the affair. 240 In 1991, Walsh moved to indict Abrams for lying to Congress
about Oliver North’s activities and “the foreign fund-raising for the contras.” 241
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According to Walsh, Abrams had “unquestionably misled three congressional
committees” after the Hasenfus incident in which a U.S. citizen flying a supply route for
the Contras was shot down in Nicaragua. Before the Senate foreign relations committee,
Abrams insisted of this supply network:
It is not our supply system… we have been careful not to get closely involved
with it and to stay away from it. We do not encourage people to do this…, we
don’t have conversations, we don’t tell them to do this, we don’t ask them to do it.
But I think it is quite clear… that the attitude of the administration is that these
people are doing a very good thing… But that is without any encouragement and
coordination from us, other than a public speech by the president. 242
Abram’s made this assertion despite the fact that North had outlined his activities
in support of the Contras at least two meetings of the “Restricted Interagency Group” on
Central America, of which Abrams was chairman. 243 Secondly, he told Congress that
“we’re not in the fundraising business” and that he was “fairly confident that there was
no foreign government contributing” to the Contras. 244 He testified to this despite having
personally solicited funding from the Sultan of Brunei, and having assured Oliver North
that the funds were on their way. 245 In Abrams’ defense, the Contras had not actually
received these funds as he had provided Brunei with the wrong bank account number.
For this Abrams eventually pled guilty to two misdemeanors for withholding
information from Congress. He apologized, and stated, “I take full responsibility for my
actions, for my failure to make full disclosure to Congress in 1986.” 246 He was placed on
probation for two years and assigned 100 hours of community service. 247 Before he could
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complete this sentence, President George H.W. Bush, during his last month in office,
pardoned Abrams. 248
One does not need to read far into Undue Process, Abrams’ self-exculpatory book
about his prosecution, to see that he neither considers himself guilty nor is apologetic for
his actions. Abrams notes, first of all, that when he had arrived in Washington 16 years
earlier, he had neither intended nor expected to be convicted of crimes. “I could not even
have contemplated a criminal conviction,” he says, “I would have considered it ludicrous,
impossible, insane.” 249
He recounts how anticipation of his indictment made it impossible for him to
enjoy a book part for his friend Gertrude Himmelfarb, and in an internal monologue, he
refers to his prosecutors as “you miserable, filthy bastards, you bloodsuckers.” 250 Later,
he (again, internally) implores Lawrence Walsh to “drop dead. Do something useful.” 251
The most vitriolic words he chooses to include are those of his wife, Rachel. She refers to
the Office of the Independent Counsel as “those fucking animals, those vermin.” 252
Abrams also devotes the better part of one chapter to a letter from Rachel to her friend, in
which she says of the charges against her husband:
This is all about withholding information from the abominable, bloated, checkkiting, drunken, eelish, foul, greedy, hypocritical, ignorant, jelly-legged, kneehauling, lying, mindless, nictitating, obtuse, pusillanimous, quaking, ruthless,
simpering, treacherous, useless, vile, whoring, xenophobic, yellow-bellied, zeros
who populate Congress. What? Only withhold information from them? Arrest
them! Manacle them! Hang them! Electrocute them! 253
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Abrams argues throughout Undue Process that he was a victim of prosecutorial
overreach, and of a process through which petty political differences were turned into
serious crimes. 254 He weakens his case, perhaps, by arguing that “for most Americans,
the federal criminal justice system is filled with safeguards” but that “the legal system
established by Congress to pursue senior officials of the Executive Branch bears no
resemblance to this at all.” 255 The charge that Executive Branch officials are uniquely
persecuted by the U.S. criminal justice system rings hollow, especially considering that
Abrams was pardoned before he even served his relatively light sentence of probation
and community service.
Some did find Abrams’ defense persuasive. Robert Novak, a conservative
journalist on whose show Abrams appeared to offer misleading information about the
Hasenfus incident, explicitly calls Abrams’ prosecution “Kafkaesque,” comparing his
ordeal to that of a Kafka character who is executed for crimes that are never revealed to
him. 256 Novak further asserts that Abrams’ prosecution “recalls the excesses of state
power that peaked in Berlin and Moscow.” 257 Overall, Novak seems to endorse Abrams’
assessment that the case against him was pursued out of political spite by liberals out for
revenge against Reaganite Republicans.
In his own book, Abrams describes finding such media reactions gratifying,
saying that he gained “satisfaction reading the editorials that praised my work and
denounced the prosecution.” 258 Novak’s assessment was not unique. The Wall Street
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Journal’s editorial at the time of Abrams’ guilty plea declared the prosecution to be
“character assassination.” 259 This basic characterization of Abrams’ prosecution by his
defenders persists to today. In 2017, an opinion piece by Hudson Institute adjunct fellow
Ronald Radosh, supporting Abrams’ consideration for the post of Deputy Secretary of
State in the Trump administration, declared Abrams’ “trial and conviction was nothing
but a witch hunt.” 260
There is one contention made by Abrams and his defenders that even some of his
most ardent critics support. Robert Novak called the charges to which Abrams’ pled
guilty “trivial to the point of absurdity” – in Abrams’ words, they were “Mickey Mouse
crap.” 261 Speaking to Democracy Now!, investigative journalist Allan Nairn stated:
What Abrams was charged with and pled guilty to was the most trivial aspect of
both the Contra operation and the whole U.S. policy in Central America... he was
never charged by the U.S. prosecutors with providing weapons to terrorists, which
is what the Salvadoran army and the Guatemalan army and the CIA-backed, U.S.created Contras were behaving as, at the time. He was not charged with that. He
was not charged with abetting crimes against humanity or genocide. 262
When Nairn confronted Abrams with this same argument – that he ought to be
tried for abetting crimes against humanity – during an appearance on Charlie Rose in
1995, Abrams responded: “Yes, right, we’ll put all the American officials who won the
Cold War in the dock.” 263 This might be persuasive if one accepts that the overthrow of
the Sandinistas and the survival of brutal regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala were

259

Baltimore Sun, “Abrams Pleads Guilty,” The Baltimore Sun, accessed April 4, 2019,
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1991-10-10-1991283134-story.html.
260
Ronald Radosh, “Elliott Abrams Doesn’t Deserve Attacks From the Right,” Hudson Institute, accessed
April 4, 2019, http://www.hudson.org/research/13332-elliott-abrams-doesn-t-deserve-attacks-from-theright.
261
Novak, “Abrams and the Special Prosecutor” 76; Abrams, Undue Process, 45.
262
“Allan Nairn: Trump’s Venezuela Envoy Elliott Abrams Is a War Criminal Who Has Abetted
Genocide.”
263
Ibid.

69

vital to winning the Cold War, or to the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union. However,
as Nairn says, although U.S. Central America policy “was being portrayed by Abrams
and others at the time as a battle to prevent El Salvador and Guatemala and Nicaragua
from becoming wings of the Soviet Union, anyone familiar with the facts on the ground
knew that that was ridiculous. That was not at all what was at stake.” 264 Instead, “what
was at stake was a battle between local oligarchies” and “the poor peasant and small
working-class majorities.” 265

Abrams in the Second Bush Administration
After Elliott Abrams pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress,
even some of his firm supporters expressed doubts that he would be able to return to a
government career. Robert Novak, in 1992, declared it “too late to ease the pain or save
the public career of Elliott Abrams.” 266 As it turned out, this was not the case.
After the election of President George W. Bush in 2000, Abrams was appointed
as “special assistant to the president and senior director of the National Security Council
for democracy, human rights, and international organizations.” 267 Probably anticipating
that Abrams’ guilty plea would make it hard for him to be confirmed by the Senate, the
Bush administration chose to place him in a series of roles at the National Security
Council, where positions do not require the Senate’s approval. 268 After this first role,
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Abrams also served as “special assistant to the president and senior director of the
National Security Council for Near East and North African Affairs,” and later, “deputy
assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor for global democracy
strategy.” 269
Less information is available on Abrams’ specific actions in these various roles,
as they have not been subject to the same level of investigation as Iran-Contra and the
Reagan administration’s Central America policy, and much more information remains
classified. However, Abrams nonetheless managed to associate himself at least in some
way with several major blunders during his second period in government.
First, in 2002, there was an unsuccessful coup attempt against then-president of
Venezuela Hugo Chavez. 270 Chavez was briefly pushed out of power before being
restored on the basis of both popular support and support from the Venezuelan
military. 271 The extent of U.S. involvement in and backing of the coup is not yet known,
but at the time, the London Observer named Abrams as “the crucial figure around the
coup” and claimed that he “gave a nod” to the plot. 272
Abrams also may have played a role in blocking a peace proposal from Iran to the
U.S. in 2003. The proposal was sent by fax, and based on the chain of command in the
National Security Council, it should have been received by Abrams and then transferred
to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. 273 However, Rice never received it.
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Most notably, Abrams played a key role in the course of U.S. policy action that
led to the Islamist political party and insurgent group Hamas taking full control of the
Gaza strip in Palestine.
After Bush took office in 2000, his administration advocated for new Palestinian
legislative elections. 274 According to a Vanity Fair report, Palestinian officials warned
the Bush administration that the ruling party, Fatah, was unprepared for elections
scheduled for January 2006, as it struggled against public perceptions of corruption and
inept rule. President Bush nonetheless insisted that the elections go forward, and when
they did, Hamas won 56 percent of seats in the Palestinian parliament. 275
Per Vanity Fair, “few within the U.S. administration had predicted the result, and
there was no contingency plan to deal with it.” 276 Administration officials were left
baffled by their own policy decision, with one Department of Defense official asking
“who the fuck recommended this?” 277 Abrams himself admitted that the administration’s
lack of concern for Fatah’s prospects was “condescending, suggesting that we thought
Arabs, or Palestinian Arabs, could not really be expected to have honest public
institutions.”278 At this point, some analysts suggested the Hamas’s moderate elements
could be bolstered and that it could be drawn into the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
The administration quickly took a different tack, however, reversing its support for
Palestinian democracy and attempting to push the Hamas government out of power.
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What resulted was a “covert initiative, approved by Bush and implemented by
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Deputy National Security Adviser Elliott
Abrams, to provoke a Palestinian civil war.” 279 The U.S. opposed Abbas’s efforts to form
a unity government with Hamas, and instead pushed him to dissolve the Hamascontrolled parliament and form an emergency government, a move of dubious legality
under the Palestinian constitution.280
Anticipating that this kind of presidential coup would trigger an uprising from
Hamas, the U.S. moved to strengthen Fatah’s security forces. A “dirty war” ensued
between Fatah and Hamas’ forces in Gaza, “with both sides committing atrocities” such
as torture, kidnapping, and assassinations. 281 With echoes of Iran-Contra, U.S. officials
looked to covert means to supply Fatah with weapons and funds to pay security
personnel, reaching out to the leadership of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates to do so. 282 As Egyptian-trained-and-equipped Fatah fighters arrived in
Gaza, Hamas responded by ramping up its attacks on Fatah. Hamas first moved to expel
one particularly brutal branch of Fatah’s security apparatus, but after early success seized
on the opportunity to gain more control. 283 After five days of fighting, Fatah forces were
completely expelled from Gaza, leaving Hamas in total control of the strip.
Hamas’ leadership insists that they would not have seized control “if Fatah had
not provoked it.” 284 Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum told Vanity Fair: “if we had let
them stay loose in Gaza, there would have been more violence.” One former Bush
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administration official, David Wurmser, agreed, saying that “it looks to me that what
happened wasn’t so much a coup by Hamas but an attempted coup by Fatah that was
preempted before it could happen.” 285
Abrams’ exact role in this series of U.S. actions is not entirely clear. However,
Yezid Sayigh, a scholar of Middle East studies, asserts that Abrams was the most
prominent ‘hardliner’ in the Bush administration pushing for a “hard coup” against
Hamas. 286 This assertion is supported by Beverley Milton-Edwards, who states that
Abrams “made no secret that the U.S. government was determined to ensure that Hamas
failed in government,” and that he “worked covertly to provoke armed confrontation
between Fatah and Hamas.” 287
Ultimately, as David Rose, author of the aforementioned Vanity Fair exposé,
notes, “it is impossible to say for sure whether the outcome in Gaza would have been any
better – for the Palestinian people, for the Israelis, and for America’s allies in Fatah – if
the Bush administration had pursued a different policy. One thing, however, seems
certain: it could not be any worse.” 288
Some have speculated that the outcome in Gaza was not as bad for policymakers
like Elliott Abrams as it may appear. Said one Fatah commander: “We can only conclude
that having Hamas in control serves their overall strategy, because their policy was so
crazy otherwise.” 289 This speculation is not unfounded. As Professor Glenn Robinson
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notes, Abrams was “widely seen as opposed to any substantive peace effort.” 290 In fact,
Abrams referred to the Bush administration’s peace efforts as “just process to keep the
Europeans and moderate Arabs on the team.” 291 For one opposed to the creation of a
viable Palestinian state, the existence of two competing Palestinian governments is
certainly an asset.

Abrams Outside of Government
Like many policymakers who are political appointees rather than career civil
servants, Elliot Abrams has been periodically forced to exit public service when a
Democrat occupies the presidency. In these interim periods, Abrams has, buttressed by
his personal connections, enjoyed a number of sinecures and honorific positions that have
helped maintain his status as a member of the foreign policy elite in good standing.
His Council on Foreign Relations biography puts these positions on proud
display, and is notable for what it includes and omits. This biography mentions Abrams
receipt of the “Secretary of State’s Distinguished Service Award” from his boss in the
Reagan administration, George Shultz. 292 It also notes that he was granted the “ScholarStatesman Award” from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a think tank
whose Board of Advisers includes such prominent members of the political elite as Henry
Kissinger, George Shultz, former Senator Joseph Lieberman, former U.S. admiral James
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Stavridis, and former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey. 293 It does not
mention that he pleaded guilty for withholding information from Congress.
After the end of the Reagan administration, Abrams was named a senior fellow at
the Hudson Institute, a conservative foreign policy think tank where he wrote on the
future of U.S. foreign policy. 294 Such partisan sinecures offer relief for policymakers
whose actions in government have made them at least temporarily toxic to more
mainstream institutions. In 1996, Abrams became president of the “Ethics and Public
Policy Center,” another conservative think tank. If this seems ironic given his criminal
conviction, it should also be noted that the Ethics and Public Policy Center was founded
by one Ernest Lefever – the same man who would have had what became Abrams’ post
of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs had the
former’s white supremacist views not been exposed. 295
If Abrams was briefly toxic to mainstream foreign policy organizations, this did
not last. In 1999, Abrams was appointed by then-Speaker of the House of Representatives
Newt Gingrich to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, a bipartisan
federal government commission “dedicated to defending the universal right to freedom of
religion or belief abroad.” 296 He was appointed to this position again in 2012 by thenSpeaker John Boehner. 297 From 2009 to 2016, Abrams was a member of the U.S.
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Holocaust Memorial Council, the governing body of the U.S. Holocaust Museum. 298 He
is currently a member of the Museum’s “Committee on Conscience,” a position he shares
with, among others, the former diplomat Nicholas Burns, who recently defended Abrams
as “a devoted public servant” on Twitter. 299 Abrams is currently on leave from the board
of the National Endowment for Democracy, a U.S. government-backed non-profit which
mostly supports pro-American civil society groups abroad. 300 He is also an adjunct
professor at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service. 301
Perhaps most notably, Abrams was hired as a “Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern
Studies” at the Council on Foreign Relations in 2009. In its hiring statement, CFR, which
is purported to be the preeminent membership organization of the U.S. foreign policy
community, called Abrams “an expert in U.S. policy in the Middle East, IsraeliPalestinian affairs, and democracy promotion,” failing to mention how he actually
employed this “expertise.” 302
Khaldoun Khelil, a political risk adviser and security policy expert, described on
Twitter his experience at CFR at the time Abrams was hired there. Abrams was appointed
a fellow, Khelil asserts, because CFR President Richard Haass “saw him as a mentor.” 303
He describes Abrams’ hire as “a contentious decision, but not uncommon in the
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consequence-free world of policy analysis.” 304 CFR members who protested Abrams’
appointment – according to Khelil, some would “dramatically leave the room when
Abrams began to speak on Syria or other matters” or “openly mocked or laughed at him
when he was on panels” – risked reprimand from Haass. Khelil says: “Haass even
upbraided a good friend of mine at a cocktail party for embarrassing his friend Elliott
Abrams, threatening a mutual friend of ours as being ‘on thin ice’ in the organization.” 305
If Khelil is to be believed, than it was Abrams’ friendship with Richard Haass more than
his professional record that protected his job at CFR.
In 2013, Abrams drew backlash on the Council when, in an appearance on NPR
where he was arguing against the confirmation of Senator Chuck Hagel to lead the
Department of Defense, he alleged that Hagel “seems to have some kind of problem with
Jews.” 306 Others in the foreign policy community called this accusation “baseless” and
prominent Israelis and American Jews defended Hagel. 307 This led to Haass rebuking
Abrams’ attack and distancing the Council from it, calling it “over the line.” 308 Some
called on Haass to ask Abrams to apologize, and fire him from the Council if he
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refused. 309 Instead, Abrams essentially stood by his attack, and even doubled-down on
it. 310 He retained his post.
Elliott Abrams thus makes a fine poster child for the integration of the U.S.
foreign policy elite, and for the impunity it engenders. Abrams’ career exhibits almost
every one of Putnam’s dimensions of elite cohesion to a striking degree. He is a
beneficiary of the “common patterns of recruitment” of the foreign policy elite, having
attended Harvard both as an undergraduate and for law school. He began his professional
career as a Senate staffer before moving to the State Department, exemplifying the lateral
mobility common to the career paths of foreign policy elites. Furthermore, as he worked
for Democrats in the Senate, albeit conservative ones, he was given a modicum of
bipartisan credentials. Having occupied prominent roles in different American foreign
policy institutions, both inside and outside of government, for the past four decades,
Abrams’ career highlights the “institutional context” of the foreign policy elite.
The factor of integration most strikingly demonstrated by Abrams is “extensive
personal interaction.” Abrams embodies the importance of this in numerous ways, as
seemingly every relationship in his life represents yet another connection to members of
the foreign policy elite. Even through marriage, he is related to the neoconservative
writers and editors Midge Decter, John Podhoretz, and Norman Podhoretz.
These personal interactions beget group solidarity, which begets impunity.
Richard Haass and the varied members of the foreign policy elite whose defenses of
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Abrams were mentioned at the beginning of this chapter were all inclined to support their
friend, mentor, boss, or colleague in spite of so much in his career that is plainly
indefensible. It is a function of this phenomenon more than anything else that enables
Abrams to have a thriving career in foreign policy today.
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Henry Kissinger
“The illegal we do immediately; the unconstitutional takes a little longer” – Henry
Kissinger to the foreign minister of Turkey, 1975.

Henry Kissinger lays claim to a number of superlatives in the history of American
foreign policy. He is very likely America’s most famous diplomat, and one of its most
widely celebrated. Indeed, in 1973, when he became the United States Secretary of State,
a Gallup poll found him to be the most admired person in America. 311 In the words of
Walter Isaacson, author of Kissinger: A Biography, he was “one of the most unlikely
celebrities ever to capture the world’s imagination.” 312
Through the policies he implemented, he also amassed what is surely one of the
largest body counts of any director of U.S. foreign policy. According to historian Greg
Grandin, “a back-of-the-envelope count would attribute 3, maybe 4 million deaths to
Kissinger’s actions, but that number probably undercounts his victims in southern
Africa.” 313 While Kissinger’s involvement in most of these deaths was quite indirect
– most were carried out by foreign actors he supported, not by U.S. personnel that he or
the presidents he served could command – this has made him among the most despised
figures in American foreign policy history, and perhaps in contemporary American
history at large. According to Isaacson, “large segments of the American public, ranging
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from liberal intellectuals to conservative activists” view Kissinger as a “power
manipulator dangerously devoid of moral principles.” 314
This view of Kissinger as a deeply amoral man stems from his famously “realist”
worldview and his alleged practice of “realpolitik.” The realist tradition in foreign affairs,
as Isaacson describes it, is “based on a pessimistic view of human nature.” 315 Under this
paradigm, power is the central concern of international relations. Nations have interests
that are often at odds with one another, and protecting these interests takes precedence
over pursuing goals of justice or human welfare. To a realist like Kissinger, “the goal of
statecraft” is “stability, best achieved through unsentimental alliances, a carefully tended
balance of power, and competing spheres of influence.” 316 To pursue these goals, states
must be willing to deploy military force. He also placed a great emphasis on “credibility,”
or the perceptions on the part of other states that the U.S. is willing and able to exert force
to defend its interests abroad. 317
Thus Kissinger saw himself in conflict with the prevailing tradition of Wilsonian
idealism in American foreign policy, which declared goals such as making the world
“safe for democracy.” 318 He blamed this idealism for America’s tendency “to lurch over
the years between isolationism and idealism” and to “embark on crusades, and then to
recoil into self-conscious withdrawal.” 319 While some policymakers, activists, and
pundits wanted the U.S. to advocate for democratization on the part of its allies and
adversaries alike, Kissinger would ask “why is it our business how they govern
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themselves?”320 In a striking example of this attitude, he privately declared: “if they put
Jews into gas chambers in the Soviet Union, it is not an American concern. Maybe a
humanitarian concern.” 321
This worldview contributed to Kissinger’s unique approach to foreign policy, and
to highly disparate policy outcomes. On the one hand, his more rational assessment of
states like the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union as adversaries rather than
embodiments of a monolithic evil enabled him to strike impressive diplomatic
achievements with both of those countries. 322 He recognized that nuclear weapons
necessitated stable relationships with both of these nations, despite the underlying
antagonism of their values to those of the United States. 323 On the other hand, his lack of
moral concerns and tendency to see every event abroad as either “a gain for the Soviets or
for the West” led him to involve U.S. support and resources in conflicts that were
probably peripheral to vital national interests, at great cost to human life and sometimes,
to the success of U.S. foreign relations. 324

Kissinger’s Early Life
Henry Kissinger’s early life distinguishes him from most of the men who ran U.S.
foreign policy before him, and from the men and women who would come to run it after
him. He was born as Heinz Kissinger in Fürth, a small town in Bavaria, in 1923. 325 As a
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Jew growing up during the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany, he was subject to
debasement and discrimination. 326 He might have been subjected to much more had his
family not left Germany for New York in 1938, when Kissinger was 15 years old; at least
13 of his close relatives were killed in the Holocaust. 327
Kissinger tends to minimize the impact growing up in Nazi Germany had on him,
claiming that “it was not a lifelong trauma.” 328 Those who knew him well, however, have
argued that the experience shaped him, instilling in him “an instinctive aversion to
revolutionary change” and an equal aversion to anything perceived as disorder. As a
foreign policy philosophy, this manifested in his “realist, realpolitik approach that sought
to preserve order through balances of power and a willingness to use force as a tool of
diplomacy.” 329
In 1943, as a relatively recent immigrant, Kissinger was drafted into the U.S.
Army. Thanks to the support of a higher officer named Fritz Kraemer, he was moved
from an infantry unit into the Army Counter-Intelligence Corps. 330 In this role, as a
municipal administrator for the post-war occupation of Germany, he “purged Nazis from
municipal posts” and “distinguished himself as an intelligence agent, identifying,
arresting, and interrogating Gestapo officers and securing confidential informants.” 331
In Kissinger’s academic career and early professional life after the war, the
importance of Robert Putnam’s dimensions of elite integration in his advancement into
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the upper ranks of the foreign policy establishment is highly apparent. First, he entered
one of the common “pathways of recruitment” to the elite: Harvard College. At Harvard,
he forged key personal connections. As a student of government and philosophy, he
benefited from the patronage of Professor William Yandell Elliott, just as he did from the
support of Fritz Kraemer in the Army. Elliott helped him advance “both as an
undergraduate and later in his quest to become a tenured professor.” 332
With Elliott’s support, Kissinger started the Harvard International Seminar, a
summer program that invited young leaders – “men and women in elective office, civil
service jobs, or journalism” – to Harvard for a lecture series. 333 This program connected
Kissinger with influential professors and public figures, along with donors like the
Rockefeller and Ford Foundation. Among the participants, several went on to become
important foreign leaders, including Mahathir Mohammad, longtime prime minister of
Malaysia. 334 Shortly after, Kissinger founded and edited a journal of international affairs
called Confluence that helped him “build a network of intellectuals and politicians,
including Hannah Arendt, Sidney Hook, Arthur Schlesinger, Daniel Ellsberg, and
Reinhold Niebuhr.” 335 Isaacson called this journal “more a method of selfaggrandizement by Kissinger and his contributors than a true addition to the literature of
foreign affairs.” 336 This impression was supported by Professor Thomas Schelling, a
contemporary at Harvard, who said that the journal was “primarily an enterprise designed
to make Henry known to great people around the world.” 337
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Through his relationship with Arthur Schlesinger, Kissinger came to write a piece
for Foreign Affairs that led to his employment at the Council on Foreign Relations as
director of a study group on nuclear weapons and foreign policy beginning in 1954. 338
This position further embedded Kissinger within the “institutional context” of the foreign
policy elite, and in this capacity he was able to advise the prominent liberal Republican
politician Nelson Rockefeller, and to maintain “his contacts in the military intelligence
community.” 339 He concurrently served on “government committees related to covert
operations and psychological warfare,” including the Operations Research Office, the
Psychological Strategy Board, and the Operations Coordinating Board. 340
In the 1957 book he produced in his CFR role, entitled Nuclear Weapons and
Foreign Policy, he advanced a critique of the Eisenhower administration’s containment
doctrine that would gain some purchase in later administrations. For one, Kissinger
pushed back against the doctrine of massive retaliation because he believed it fostered a
reluctance to use nuclear weapons at all. 341 He also suggested that the United States
ought to “demonstrate a willingness to fight ‘little wars’ in the world’s ‘grey areas,’”
including regions considered marginal at the time. This directly referenced Southeast
Asia, including Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, where the United States, and Kissinger
himself, would soon become embroiled.
Kissinger returned to Harvard, and in 1959 became a tenured professor there. In
this role he was noted for his abrasive and conspiratorial interpersonal style – Leslie Gelb
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described him as “devious with his peers, domineering with his subordinates, obsequious
to his superiors.” 342 From 1961 to 1968, Kissinger remained at Harvard while working on
the periphery of government. He continued to advise Nelson Rockefeller, and also served
as a consultant on foreign policy to the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon
Johnson.
In 1968, when Rockefeller lost the Republican nomination for president to
Richard Nixon, Kissinger was despondent. He declared Nixon “not fit to be president”
and after seeing the chaos of the Democratic National Convention that same year,
lamented “I’ll never serve in government again.” 343 In true realist fashion, however, he
quickly changed course. He was advising the Johnson administration on ongoing peace
talks between the U.S. and Vietnam, the success of which might have tipped the balance
against Nixon winning the upcoming presidential election. Kissinger reached out to
Nixon’s staff, offering to keep them informed on the progress of the talks. When a
breakthrough occurred, he informed the Nixon campaign, which through a backchannel
contact encouraged the South Vietnamese government to scuttle the talks, promising
more favorable terms after Nixon took office. 344 These efforts succeeded; the talks fell
apart, and Nixon won. On the basis of this assistance, Nixon asked Kissinger to take
control of a newly-empowered National Security Council as National Security Adviser.
Under Nixon, Kissinger would help center foreign policymaking in the White House, and
therefore in his own office. Thus began Kissinger’s tumultuous and controversial decade
at the reigns of American foreign policy.
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The Successes of Realpolitik
As National Security Adviser, Kissinger was immediately able to put his theories
of realpolitik to the test. He could pursue policies based on the goals of protecting
America’s national interests and maintaining global balances of power, and eschew moral
and idealistic crusades. In a few key areas, this approach led to massive diplomatic
successes that cannot be ignored: most notably, the opening of relations with communist
China, and the policy of detente with the Soviet Union.
The former is perhaps Kissinger’s most famous diplomatic achievement. 345
Kissinger had been advocating for a dialogue with China since before joining Nixon’s
staff through speeches for Nelson Rockefeller suggesting a “subtle triangle” of relations
between the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union. 346 Come 1969, President Nixon reached
the same position. Both he and Kissinger suspected that the Soviet Union and China
“were more afraid of each other than they were of the United States.” 347 Both Nixon and
Kissinger recognized that conflict between the two communist powers could pressure
them to seek improved relations with the U.S. 348
After attempting to reach out to China via backchannel messages through 1969,
Nixon and Kissinger succeeded in making contact through Pakistani President Yahya
Khan, and both sides conveyed interest in a high-level meeting. 349 This led to Kissinger’s
secret 1971 trip to China, in which he met with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and the two
agreed that President Nixon would visit China for a summit the next year. 350
345
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This meeting led to the reopening of relations between the U.S. and China, and to
a joint communique tacitly opposing Soviet aggression in the Asia-Pacific region. 351
Thanks to this development, the “pattern of international relations changed
dramatically.” 352 This assessment by Kissinger is supported by former U.S. ambassador
Robert Blackwill, who describes this development as “no less than a fundamental
restructuring of the global balance of power and world order in America’s favor.” 353
Robert Kaplan, senior fellow at the Center for a New American security, further notes
that this realignment can be credited for humanitarian benefits, as, by “providing
assurances” against Soviet aggression and “an economically resurgent Japan” China had
the security “to devote itself to peaceful economic development” which helped bring
around one billion people out of poverty. 354
Furthermore, as Kissinger noted, the Soviet Union now “faced challenges on two
fronts – NATO in the West, and China in the East.” 355 This made Soviet confrontation
with either adversary more risky, and thus “the Soviet Union’s best option became
seeking its own relaxation of tensions with the United States.” 356 The normalization of
relations with China therefore helped pave the way for the successes of detente.
The term “detente” describes a broad policy direction in which the U.S. sought to
ease tensions with the Soviet Union and in Isaacson’s terms, “to modulate their global
competition by pursuing areas of mutual interest and indulging in occasional displays of
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friendship.” 357 Kissinger recognized that the realities of nuclear weapons made it vital for
the U.S. and Soviet Union to “seek a more productive and stable relationship despite the
basic antagonism of our values.” 358 There was also a long-term strategy underlying
Kissinger’s support for detente. He assessed that the Soviet Union was too weak to
directly challenge the United States, and that merely by maintaining a stable relationship
between the two nuclear powers, the U.S. could allow the Soviets’ vulnerabilities to
deepen:
Soviet strength is uneven, the weaknesses and frustrations of the Soviet system
are glaring and have been clearly documented. Despite the inevitable increase in
its power, the Soviet Union remains far behind us and our allies in any overall
assessment of military, economic, and technological strength; it would be reckless
in the extreme for the Soviet Union to challenge the industrial democracies. And
Soviet society is no longer insulated from the influences and attractions of the
outside world or impervious to the need for external contacts. 359
Therefore, Kissinger’s policy sought to manage areas that threatened to
destabilize this bilateral relationship, namely in the construction and deployment of
strategic arms and in issues of borders and security in Europe.
The first of these two issues was addressed in a series of arms control agreements
struck during Nixon’s visit to Moscow in 1972 and in Kissinger’s secret trip there that
preceded it. These visits resulted in the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). 360 These two treaties successfully linked the
issue of defensive weaponry, where the United States had an edge on the Soviet Union,
with that of offensive weaponry, where the Soviet Union had the advantage. 361 Both sides
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agreed to limit ABM defense to two sites, effectively neutralizing its purpose and
ensuring that the deterrent logic of nuclear weapons was maintained. 362 Regarding
offensive missile forces, the two parties agreed to freeze their stocks of missiles at
“agreed levels.” 363 This included missiles deployed on submarines, but did not include
bombers, where the U.S. had the advantage. 364
These treaties were not without drawbacks – namely, they permitted missiles to
be equipped with multiple warheads, which created a loophole for buildup in strategic
weaponry that both nations exploited.365 In reality the, SALT “had little effect on the
world’s nuclear arsenals.” 366 The real significance of the agreements was, as Isaacson
emphasizes, “the development of a working relationship with Moscow” and the mutual
recognition that “an unrestrained arms race was futile, costly, and dangerous.” Together,
these advances made the arms control agreement “an achievement of enormous historic
magnitude.” 367
The second great achievement of detente came in 1975, when Kissinger was
Secretary of State for the administration of President Gerald Ford. This was the
fulfillment of a European security conference, long-desired by the Soviet Union, which
resulted in the Helsinki Accords. 368 The Soviets hoped that such a conference could
confirm the legitimacy of post-World War II borders in Eastern Europe, securing Soviet
control over its territories and giving widespread recognition to the borders of its satellite
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states. 369 To some extent, this had already been achieved by peace treaties at the end of
the war, and by West Germany’s agreements with its neighbors made a few years
earlier. 370 Ultimately, the “security basket” of the Helsinki Accords was not terribly
consequential. “Recognition” of existing borders was limited to, in Kissinger’s terms, “an
obligation not to change them by force.” 371
The Accords’ provisions on human rights, though initially seen as mere rhetoric,
proved more significant. These provisions “obliged all signatories to practice and foster
certain enumerated basic human rights.” 372 They resulted in the formation, around the
Eastern bloc, of “Helsinki groups,” made up of political dissidents who demanded that
“communist governments honor the phrases about freedom and human rights.” 373 These
dissidents included Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia and Lech Walesa in Poland, who
successfully used the Accords to pressure their communist governments, and eventually
to achieve independence and democracy in their respective states. Thus, as Isaacson says,
Helsinki “would eventually turn out to be a step on the way toward the West’s ultimate
victory in Europe.” 374
This is not an exhaustive list of what can be considered Henry Kissinger’s
positive achievements in American diplomacy. He is also widely credited with the
successes of “shuttle diplomacy” in the Middle East, especially his work in making peace
between Israel and Egypt and drawing the latter into the Western political bloc. 375 Nor
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are these successes without caveats. On Helsinki, some have criticized Kissinger for
taking credit for the successes of provisions on human rights that he had once opposed. 376
On SALT, Kissinger alienated key U.S. officials throughout the negotiating process. 377
He marginalized technical experts despite his own imperfect understanding of some
issues addressed by the treaty, which resulted, in at least one case, in the Soviets securing
provisions more favorable to themselves. 378 Isaacson asserts that the secrecy and
duplicity with which Kissinger conducted these negotiations “undermined future support
for SALT.” 379 This conduct was largely unnecessary for the success of the treaties, and
instead, as Kissinger himself admits, was influenced by his “vanity and desire to control
the final negotiation.” 380
Nonetheless, Kissinger’s role in detente and in the diplomatic opening to China
are significant accomplishments that played a role in stabilizing U.S. relations with the
communist world, thus making the world safer. Furthermore, there is reason to believe
that these policies at least contributed to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and the
American “victory” in the Cold War. As Blackwill argues in The National Interest,
detente “reduced the risk of superpower confrontation even while creating conditions that
helped undermine the Soviet Union’s moral and geopolitical claims and bring about its
destruction.” 381 These successes can therefore be viewed as vindications for Kissinger’s
realist worldview and its applicability in policymaking.
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The Dark Side of Kissinger’s Realism
Kissinger’s aforementioned achievements offer only a partial picture of his years
as America’s top foreign policy official. An examination of his full record leads to much
less generous conclusions, both in terms of its moral outcomes and its implications for
the United States’ long-term interests. A 1973 New Yorker article stated that there were
“two Henry Kissingers.” 382 On the one hand, Kissinger “established relations with China,
improved our relations with Russia, and successfully completed the first phase of SALT”
– but on the other, this was the man who “planned the undisclosed bombing of
Cambodia” along with the invasion of that country a year later; who wiretapped
journalists and his own staff, and who greenlit repression and genocidal behavior by U.S.
clients around the world. 383 This was the Kissinger whose policies accumulated the three
to four million-person body count estimated by Greg Grandin, and ultimately, the legacy
of this second Kissinger outweighs that of the first.
Henry Kissinger’s “original sin” in policymaking was his aforementioned role in
extending the Vietnam War. By 1965, well before he was in a government role, Kissinger
recognized that the war in Vietnam was essentially unwinnable. He noticed that
“Washington was relying on corrupt, unpopular, and incompetent Saigon allies,” and that
“North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia made a military solution
impossible.” 384 Additionally, the bombing of North Vietnam, viewed as the primary tool
of leverage against the communists, was “enough to mobilize world opinion against us
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but too half-hearted and gradual to be decisive.” 385 Kissinger privately conveyed these
conclusions to officials in the Johnson administration, but continued to publicly support
the war and even push for its escalation. 386 Isaacson paraphrases Kissinger’s rationale for
maintaining the futile war effort: abandoning Vietnam would “strengthen the hand of
America’s adversaries, demoralize allies, lessen the credibility of the U.S. around the
world, and cause other nations to consider shifting their allegiance to the Soviet
Union.” 387
Thus, after the 1968 election, the U.S. war in Vietnam continued for what
Grandin calls “five more pointless years.” 388 By the war’s end in 1973, Kissinger secured
a peace agreement that, according to historians Edward Crapol and Robert Schulzinger,
was “comparable to one they could have obtained in 1969.” 389 In search of a face-saving
withdrawal from Vietnam, Kissinger and Nixon implemented a strategy of removing U.S.
troops while escalating bombing against the North. 390 In 1972, as the Paris Peace
Accords progressed, the U.S. accepted North Vietnamese demands “on almost every
major point,” according to historian Larry Berman. 391 Kissinger himself privately
remarked “we bombed them into letting us accept their terms.” 392 In October 1972,
Arthur Schlesinger said of the preliminary agreement with North Vietnam: “What is most
obvious is the spectacular and unprecedented concessions we have made… What is
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saddest of all is that if Nixonger had been willing to make these concessions in 1969, we
could have had the settlement then; and 20,000 Americans and God knows how many
Vietnamese, now dead, would be alive.” 393 In a last ditch effort to wring some
concessions from the North Vietnamese, Kissinger initiated the so-called “Christmas
Bombing” of Hanoi, which targeted “civilian buildings, including hospitals.” 394 This
killed over one thousand Vietnamese, to little effect – the final treaty signed a month later
“was nearly exactly the same as what was on the table at the beginning of December.” 395
But Nixon and Kissinger had other concerns. For one, there were U.S. domestic
politics, and the goal of protecting Nixon’s 1972 re-election. In 1971, regarding what
both men then saw as an inevitable South Vietnamese collapse, Kissinger declared: “we
can’t have it knocked over brutally, to put it brutally, before the election.” 396 This
suggests a departure from Kissinger’s professed realism, as he prioritized his boss’s
continued political career over some “objective” conception of American national
interests. And then there was “credibility.” Kissinger’s most ardent defenders, including
Robert Kaplan, argue that the extension of the war was necessary to “prevent complete
American humiliation.” 397 Further, Kaplan says, “this preservation of America’s global
standing enabled the president and secretary of state to manage a historic reconciliation
with China, which helped provide the requisite leverage for a landmark strategic arms
pact with the Soviet Union.” 398 The causal reasoning here is unclear. It is not obvious
how extending a brutal and futile war for several years just to accept most of the enemy’s
393
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peace terms might have helped preserve America’s reputation abroad. Even if this benefit
to U.S. credibility were demonstrable or quantifiable, it would have to be weighed against
the tens of thousands of American lives, and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese,
Cambodian, and Laotian lives that it cost.
In light of this dismal result in Vietnam, Kissinger’s actions towards neighboring
Cambodia become even more unjustifiable. Just a month after Nixon’s first inauguration,
Kissinger and other officials began planning “Operation Menu,” the secret bombing of
Cambodia. 399 Initially, these bombings were meant to target only those North Vietnamese
outposts that Kissinger had years earlier recognized as making an American victory in
Vietnam impossible. Kissinger planned both the bombings themselves and the tactics that
kept this incursion secret from Congress, the Department of Defense, and the public. 400
For no apparent military reason, he would revise targets in Cambodia that had been
selected for strikes. 401 In fact, his micromanagement of the operation was extensive – a
1973 Pentagon report revealed that “Kissinger approved each of the 3,875 Cambodia
bombing raids in 1969 and 1970 as well as the methods for keeping them out of the
newspapers.” 402
By the spring of 1970, Kissinger was pushing for an escalation in Cambodia with
a ground invasion and a broader, public bombing campaign. Nixon approved both, and
for the next two years, American bombing raids “spread to cover nearly all of Cambodia,
targeting the fast-growing rebellion and devastating the country.” 403
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As made clear earlier in this section, neither the bombing campaign nor the
ground invasion had a significant impact on the outcome of the war with Vietnam. As
Grandin notes, “Hanoi never budged on Kissinger’s most important demand – that it
withdraw troops from South Vietnam – nor was its ability to conduct military operations
in Vietnam seriously damaged.” 404 Where the U.S. incursion did have great effects,
however, was in Cambodia itself, and these results were both morally and strategically
hideous.
Throughout the length of the bombing campaign, the U.S. dropped, at the very
least, 500,000 tons of explosives on Cambodia. This is roughly the same tonnage of
bombs the U.S. dropped in the Pacific theater in the entirety of the Second World War (in
neighboring Laos, the U.S. also dropped 2.5 million tons of bombs). 405 The number of
Cambodian civilians killed in these raids was at least 50,000, though estimates range as
high as 150,000. 406 Much of this bombing, including its most intense phase, occurred
after the Paris Peace Accords were signed with Vietnam in 1973. 407
Far more Cambodians would be killed by the political destabilization that this
bombing wrought. The bombing served to weaken the government of Prince Norodom
Sihanouk, who was contending with the communist insurgency of the Khmer Rouge as
well as the divergent interests of Vietnam, China, and the U.S. within his country. 408 The
Khmer Rouge and its genocidal aims predated U.S. intervention in Cambodia, and would
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have been a factor without this action. 409 However, per Ben Kiernan, a prominent
historian of the Cambodian genocide, “Pol Pot’s revolution would not have won power
without U.S. economic and military destabilization of Cambodia.” 410 As Brett Morris
writes, “at the beginning of the [U.S.] escalation, KR fighters numbered less than 10,000,
but by 1973, the force had grown to over 200,000 troops and militia.” 411 Interviews by
Ben Kiernan depict how U.S. bombings, the rationale for which was incomprehensible to
Cambodian civilians, became the Khmer Rouge’s most effective recruiting tool: “it was
because of their dissatisfaction with the bombing that they kept on cooperating with the
Khmer Rouge, joining up with the Khmer Rouge, sending their children off to go with
them” said one Khmer Rouge cadre. 412 Another witness expressed that “people in our
village were furious with the Americans, they did not know why the Americans had
bombed them.” 413
In 1970, Prince Sihanouk was overthrown in a coup by the right-wing general Lon
Nol. 414 While a direct U.S. role in the coup is not proven, evidence compiled by William
Blum in his book Killing Hope suggests that the U.S. was likely complicit and at least
supportive of the move. 415 This coup helped further shape conditions for the benefit of
the Khmer Rouge. Supporters of Sihanouk, along with North Vietnam, aligned
themselves with the Khmer Rouge against Lon Nol. 416 At the same time, continued U.S.
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bombing slowed this opposition and weakened its moderate elements, ensuring that by
the time of its victory in 1975, the most radical faction of this insurgency, led by Pol Pot,
“had come to dominate the Khmer Rouge,” and thus, Cambodia’s new government. 417
Curiously, this led to Kissinger and the U.S. pivoting towards support of the
Khmer Rouge, seeing an independent, if communist, Cambodia as a potential
“counterweight to North Vietnam.” 418 In 1975, Kissinger told the Thai foreign minister to
tell the Khmer Rouge “that we bear no hostility towards them… tell the Cambodians that
we will be friends with them. They are murderous thugs, but we won’t let that stand in
our way. We are prepared to improve relations with them.” 419
The Khmer Rouge were apparently not all that receptive, and “would largely chart
an isolationist course, concentrating instead on its project of building a self-sufficient,
agrarian society that ended in mass murder.” 420 By 1979, when the Khmer Rouge was
toppled by a Vietnamese invasion, “as many as two million people had been murdered or
had died – of starvation, exhaustion, disease, and denial of medical care.” 421 In the
interest of isolating Vietnam, subsequent U.S. administrations continued to support a
Khmer Rouge insurgency against the Vietnamese-backed government in Cambodia. The
Carter administration “helped arrange Chinese aid” to the Khmer Rouge, while through
the 1980s, the U.S. funded Khmer Rouge-aligned guerrillas, recognized the insurgency as
“the legitimate government of Cambodia,” and secured for it Cambodia’s seat at the
United Nations. 422
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Grandin argues that Kissinger’s actions in Cambodia are distinct from his policies
elsewhere that draw similar criticism. Unlike the atrocities he supported in other contexts,
the policy towards Cambodia could not be “justified by reason of state.” 423 In other
words, this was not merely an act of supporting or tolerating atrocities by a U.S. client,
but instead involved the U.S. directly committing atrocities in order to “bend peasantpoor countries like Cambodia to their will.” 424
Nonetheless, Kissinger’s policies elsewhere also bear mentioning here. Another
one of Kissinger’s most famous episodes of atrocity was his support for Pakistan’s
“bloody crackdown on its restive Bengali population in 1971,” described by Gary J. Bass
in his book The Blood Telegram. 425 Throughout this period, “Kissinger stood behind
Pakistan… even as it swept away the results of a democratic election, killed horrific
numbers of Bengalis, and targeted the Hindu minority among Bengalis.” 426
In 1970, after free elections in what was then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)
were won by Bengali separatists, the breakdown of negotiations between separatists and
the military government in West Pakistan led to a violent onslaught by the Pakistani army
against Bengali civilians. According to Bass, senior officials in the White House and
State Department warned Nixon and Kissinger “that a military crackdown would fail and
result in Pakistan splitting in two, hurting U.S. strategic interests.” 427 Archer Blood, the
U.S. consul general in Dhaka, East Pakistan, argued that U.S. support for Pakistan would
drive India, and upon its independence, Bangladesh, closer to the Soviet Union. 428
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Kissinger’s own aide, Harold Saunders, noted that in terms of balance of power, it would
be preferable for the U.S. to align itself with “the 600 million people of India and East
Pakistan” against the comparatively smaller and weaker West Pakistan. 429
Kissinger did not heed these concerns, and he and Nixon gave Pakistan blank
check support. He did nothing to warn the Pakistani leadership against its killing
campaign in Bangladesh, despite warnings that it would backfire. As India invaded
Bangladesh to stop the slaughter of Bengalis and halt the flows of millions of refugees
over its borders, Kissinger and Nixon initiated “illegal arms transfers” to the Pakistani
military, despite Kissinger’s admission to the president that this would be against U.S.
law. 430 Finally, after India defeated Pakistan and ejected their forces from the East,
“Nixon and Kissinger sent an aircraft carrier group into the Bay of Bengal to threaten
India.” 431 This brought U.S.-India relations to a nadir. Kissinger then encouraged China
to move troops towards its border with India. The Chinese leadership refused, but this
action could have drawn in the Soviet Union to support India, and escalated the war into
a nuclear crisis. 432
In an article for The National Interest, former U.S. ambassador to India Robert
Blackwill defends Kissinger and criticizes Bass’s account of this episode. His defense
hinges on the importance of Pakistan as a backchannel to China, and the fear that India,
triumphant in East Pakistan, might choose to invade the western part of the country and
crush the Pakistani military. 433 There are a few obvious issues with this rationale. For
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one, by the time India and Pakistan were at war in December 1971, Kissinger had already
made his secret trip to China, and the two countries were in contact independently of
Pakistan – not to mention that Pakistan was only one of a few avenues through which the
administration had reached out to Beijing. 434 Furthermore, given China’s hesitance to
support Pakistan by moving its troops toward India, there is little indication that lessrobust support of Pakistan by the U.S. would have caused China to break off nascent
relations with America, considering its much larger concerns over Soviet aggression.
Lastly, the U.S. could have deterred India from aggression against West Pakistan without
supporting Pakistan’s crackdown in Bangladesh. For instance, an aircraft carrier group
could have been sent to West Pakistani waters in the Arabian Sea, rather than Indian and
East Pakistani waters in the Bay of Bengal.
Bass notes some further ironies in response to Blackwill’s critique; for one, that it
was written in The National Interest, which is published by the think tank “Center for the
National Interest,” where Henry Kissinger is an honorary chairman. To top this off,
Blackwill also happens to be the “Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow” at the Council on
Foreign Relations. 435
All told, somewhere between 300,000 and 500,000 people were killed in
Pakistan’s crackdown in Bangladesh. 436 In absolute fairness, this included some tens of
thousands of civilians killed by supporters of the Bengali-nationalist Awami League, but

434

Bass.
Bass.
436
Mark Dummett, “How One Newspaper Report Changed World History,” BBC News, December 16,
2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16207201.
435

103

this was ultimately dwarfed by East Pakistan’s response, which targeted the Bengali
population as a whole, not just violent separatists. 437
It is true that these atrocities could have occurred without additional U.S. arms, or
despite public or private criticism of the Pakistani leadership by Nixon and Kissinger. 438
But beyond warnings to Pakistan against the potential consequences of refugee flows to
India, the pair made few efforts. 439 It would be easier to defend this as cool-headed
realpolitik were it not for Kissinger and Nixon’s repeated statements showing open
contempt for the lives of Indians and Bengalis. Kissinger called the Indian prime
minister, Indira Gandhi, “a bitch” and Indians themselves “bastards,” while dismissing a
potential independent Bangladesh as yet another Soviet proxy, saying that Bengalis are
“by nature left.” 440 He also mocked Americans who “bleed” for “the dying Bengalis,”
while Nixon, for his part, called Indians “no goddamn good” and questioned “why the
hell anybody would reproduce in that country.” 441
Elsewhere, Kissinger’s support for atrocities by U.S. clients was much the same.
In 1975, Kissinger and Ford gave Indonesian military dictator Suharto “the go-ahead to
invade East Timor.” 442 Kissinger said only that, “it is important that whatever you do
succeeds quickly.” 443 Fueled by a continued supply of U.S. arms, the resulting Indonesian
invasion and occupation killed 102,800 Timorese “out of a population of less than
700,000. 444
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In Southern Africa, Kissinger pursued what was called “the tar baby option.” 445
This consisted of “strengthening ties to the white supremacist nations of South Africa and
Rhodesia, expanding arms sales to their militaries, and establishing clandestine networks
to conduct covert operations to counter liberation movements.” 446 In the face of
collapsing colonial regimes, Kissinger saw Southern Africa as an opportunity to
“demonstrate that events in Southeast Asia have not lessened our determination to protect
our interests.” 447 This pitted him against “area experts” at the CIA and State Department,
including “both Washington’s consul general in Angola and the CIA’s station chief,”
who believed that the popular left-wing MPLA “was the best qualified movement to
govern Angola.” 448 Against this counsel, Kissinger “stepped up covert aid to a proAmerican insurgency in Angola” and “urged South African mercenaries and the
apartheid regime’s regular forces to invade.” 449 In response, Fidel Castro’s Cuba sent its
army to fight with the MPLA, “routing the U.S.-backed invaders.” 450 Thus, in an attempt
to demonstrate American resolve and oust left-wing regimes, Kissinger elevated the
conflict in Angola to a Cold War proxy conflict, and gave Cuba an opportunity to
enhance its own international prestige.
Fear of Cuban victories against other right-wing regimes, such as that of
Rhodesia, prompted Kissinger to reverse course. He took a goodwill tour of Africa, and
“helped negotiate the surrender of Rhodesia’s white supremacist government.” 451 It was
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too late to reverse the damage done by the earlier policy, however. Pro-U.S. insurgencies
like that of Jonas Savimbi in Angola, “cultivated” and funded by Kissinger’s covert
operations, continued to wreak havoc on their countries. 452 All told, Savimbi’s
insurgency cost 400,000 lives, while “historians guess that these wars killed as many as
two million Angolans and Mozambicans.” 453
In Latin America, Kissinger saw a risk that countries in the U.S. “backyard”
would fall to Cuban-inspired revolutions and align themselves with the Soviet bloc. He
worked to preempt this by supporting, both covertly and diplomatically, military coups
and right-wing dictatorships across the continent. 454 Between 1971 and 1976, the
governments of Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Argentina fell to military
coups. 455 These coups were primarily the result of the internal dynamics of left-right
conflict within each nation, but Kissinger supported the anti-democratic right at every
turn, encouraging military dictators to view themselves as the vanguard in the global fight
against communism. 456 Furthermore, he was at the very least aware of Operation Condor,
a U.S.-supported communications network that allowed Latin American regimes to
coordinate assassinations and kidnappings of dissidents, both violent and non-violent, at
home and abroad. One result of this operation was the murder of Orlando Letelier, an
official in the pre-coup Chilean government, who was killed along with his assistant (a
U.S. citizen) in a car bombing in Washington, D.C. Five days before this act, Kissinger
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rescinded a diplomatic cable that would have warned Latin American leaders against the
“assassination of subversives, politicians, and prominent figures… abroad.” 457
Kissinger assured leaders like Augusto Pinochet that they could ignore even mild
criticism of their human rights abuses. 458 In some cases, he even greenlit such abuses
ahead of time. A recently-declassified State Department memo from 1977 describes a
conversation between Kissinger and the foreign minister of the Argentinian junta:
The Argentines were very worried that Kissinger would lecture to them on human
rights. Guzzetti and Kissinger had a very long breakfast but the Secretary did not
raise the subject. Finally Guzzetti did. Kissinger asked how long will it take you
(the Argentines) to clean up the problem. Guzzetti replied that it would be done
by the end of the year. Kissinger approved. 459
The “problem” at hand was what the Argentinian junta called “terrorism,” a label
that apparently included non-violent student activism and trade union activity. 460 As
many as 30,000 Argentinians were killed or “disappeared” in the resulting crackdown. 461
Tens of thousands more were murdered, and as many tortured, by U.S.-backed
governments around the continent. 462
As with the earlier examination of Kissinger’s successes, this list is not
exhaustive. Among other things, he also authorized the FBI to conduct illegal wiretaps of
journalists, government officials, and members of his own staff. 463 For this Kissinger
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faced a decades-long civil lawsuit from one of his former aides, which was dropped after
Kissinger issued an apology for the act. 464
Acts such as these were the dark side of Kissinger’s realism, but in many ways
they were its natural conclusion. In the words of Edward Crapol, “geopolitics… allowed
Kissinger to escape the necessity of understanding or worrying about the internal nature
of another state. In a geopolitical context, the only thing that mattered was how the other
state behaved beyond its own borders.” 465 Thus, when Kissinger looked at Angola, he
saw not popular anti-colonialists fighting white supremacists and genocidaires, but a
Soviet-proxy in waiting. In Cambodia, he saw not hundreds of thousands of innocent
people whose lives would be destroyed by American bombs, but a means to a peace
settlement in Vietnam that preserved American prestige, and therefore power.
Any of these episodes on its own would be a black mark on the record of a
prominent U.S. foreign policy official. The bombing and invasion of Cambodia alone
would make a solid case for charges of crimes against humanity. Taken together, these
acts constitute one of the most destructive legacies of any American foreign policy-maker
ever. So how, in the four decades since he left government, has Henry Kissinger become
America’s most vaunted elder statesman?

Henry Kissinger, Honorary Harlem Globetrotter
Even the most cursory examination of Henry Kissinger’s post-government life
immediately brings to mind two of Robert Putnam’s dimensions of elite integration:
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institutional context, and extensive personal interaction. As a private citizen, Kissinger’s
institutional relationships have blossomed as he has collected board seats, honorary
chairmanships, consultancies, part-time professorships, and senior fellowships. His
personal relationships with other members of America’s political, economic, and social
elite are so numerous as to render a full catalogue of them pointless, especially in a paper
of this length. Suffice to say, they provide some vindication for C. Wright Mills’
conception of the power elite, insofar as he described an incredibly tight, intermingling
network of political, economic, and social elites.
At the time of his exit from the office of Secretary of State in 1976, that Kissinger
would not return to a high government post was hardly certain. Indeed, on several
occasions he came close to reviving his government career – first in 1980, when he flirted
with making a bid for the Republican nomination for U.S. Senator in New York, and
again that same year when he attempted to broker an arrangement to make Gerald Ford
running mate to Ronald Reagan, which might have seen him back in the position of
Secretary of State. 466 Kissinger’s return to government was hampered by the fact that not
all of his relationships with other powerful figures were positive – indeed, hostility
between himself and President Carter’s national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski,
and later with President George H.W. Bush, kept him out of two administrations. 467
Kissinger expressed fear that his absence from the halls of power would reduce
his prestige, saying in 1980: “I have ten years of capital left to my reputation. Each year it
will diminish. Soon I’ll be forgotten unless I replenish it.” 468 This fear turned out to be
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unfounded. In the Reagan administration, Kissinger was eventually appointed to head the
bipartisan commission on Central America, which sought to galvanize broader support
for Reagan’s hardline anti-communist policies in Central America. 469 In the first Bush
administration, he retained access to the highest levels of government through the
appointment of his former aide, Brent Scowcroft, as national security adviser. 470
Kissinger’s positions in the private sector, however, were equally important in
maintaining his influence. In the early 80s, he began writing a syndicated column in the
Los Angeles Times that was re-published in The Washington Post and The New York
Post, among others. 471 He became a television commentator, first signing a $200,000
annual contract with NBC before moving to ABC, and, in 1989, joining the board of
CBS. 472
His primary post-government occupation, starting in 1982, became his consulting
firm, Kissinger Associates. In this capacity, he served as “a statesman for hire, one who
would, for a hefty fee, purvey foreign policy expertise to private corporations, undertake
diplomatic assignments for them, and serve as a national security adviser to their
chairmen.” 473 His clients have included American Express, AIG, Anheuser-Busch, Bell
Telephone, Chase Manhattan Bank, Coca-Cola, Fiat, H.J. Heinz, Merck Pharmaceutical,
Revlon, Trust Company of the West, and Volvo, among many others. 474
In this capacity Kissinger garnered criticism for profiting off of relationships and
policies he made while in government. In Latin America, Kissinger and his clients
469
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profited from privatization programs implemented by governments he had supported. 475
As Secretary of State, Kissinger helped the chemical company Union Carbide set up a
plant in India. Just over a decade later, as a consultant for Union Carbide, his firm helped
to arrange a “paltry” settlement for the victims of a spill at that same plant, which killed
four thousand people and “exposed another half million people to toxic gases.” 476 In
places such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, he was able to leverage the personal
relationships he had developed with foreign leaders as a diplomat to gain commercial
access for his clients. 477
Kissinger was also criticized for using his platform as an opinion-maker to push
policies that benefited himself and his clients. After the Tiananmen Square massacre in
1989, Kissinger used the platform of his column and TV appearances to oppose economic
sanctions on China, while at the same time pursuing business ventures there. 478 This is
not to say that his opposition to sanctions stemmed from the goal of protecting personal
profits – as one liberal congressman quipped, “Dr. Kissinger has always defended
oppressive dictatorships whether or not he had a financial stake in them.” 479 Nonetheless,
this demonstrates how Kissinger’s roles in different sectors – as an opinion-maker,
business elite, and former policymaker – were mutually reinforcing in ways that
redounded to his benefit.
Henry Kissinger’s other institutional affiliations range from the weighty to the
ridiculous. He is a member of the Bilderberg Group and the Bohemian Grove, two
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shadowy groups that are the subject of numerous conspiracy theories. The former is a
secretive group in which leaders from Europe and the United States meet annually for the
purpose of strengthening the Atlantic alliance. 480 The latter is a secretive all-male group
known for its annual retreat to the California redwoods, at which “American tycoons and
power brokers amuse themselves by singing silly songs, performing skits, listening to
lectures, drinking, and relieving themselves on tree trunks.” At this gathering, Henry
Kissinger “was famous for performing in the skits.” 481
Immediately upon leaving government, he was named an honorary member of the
Harlem Globetrotters basketball team. 482 He worked as a part-time professor at
Georgetown University, a senior fellow at the Aspen Institute, and a consultant to
Goldman Sachs. 483 Between 2001 and 2016, he was a member of the Department of
Defense’s Defense Policy Board. 484 According to Kissinger’s personal website, he is also
“a member of the International Council of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.; a Counselor to and
Trustee of the Center for Strategic and International Studies; an Honorary Governor of
the Foreign Policy Association; and an Honor Member of the International Olympic
Committee.” 485 The same biography states that he was a member of the Board of
Directors of ContiGroup Companies, Inc. from 1988 to 2014 (he remains an Advisor to
the Board) and he is also “a Trustee Emeritus of the Metropolitan Museum of Art; a
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Director Emeritus of Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc.; and a Director of the
International Rescue Committee.” 486
Perhaps for lack of space, or because such a resume strains one’s memory, this
biography omits Kissinger’s roles as executive vice chair of the “National Committee on
U.S.-China Relations, ” co-founder of “Rubikon Partners,” honorary chairman of the
Center for the National Interest, and his brief tenure as head of the “9/11
Commission.”487 Probably by dint of embarrassment, it also omits his role as member of
the board of directors of “Theranos,” a blood-testing startup that has been exposed as a
reckless fraud. 488
Similar reasons may motivate the exclusion of his tenure as a board member of
the Council on Foreign Relations, from 1977 to 1981. 489 Kissinger’s time on the board
ended when, with nine candidates vying for eight seats, CFR’s three thousand members
voted him off the board. 490 This unusual event was “cast as a rejection of Kissinger by
the heart of the American establishment.” 491 If it was so meaningful, however, then it was
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an aberration, as in years since, Kissinger has consolidated his position as that
establishment’s most prominent figurehead.
In recent years, his role in that regard has taken on something of a ceremonial
nature, as, at 95, he is too old to be given a substantive, functional position. While again,
an actual catalog of his ongoing relationships with prominent members of the American
elite would be hopelessly long, his birthday parties offer an illustrative picture. At his
90th birthday gala in 2014, guests included Bill and Hillary Clinton, Donald Rumsfeld,
Condoleezza Rice, Barbara Walters, John Kerry, and John McCain. Guests at his 62nd
birthday included such figures as Barbara Walters, Katharine Graham of the Washington
Post, neoconservative writers Norman Podhoretz and Midge Decter, Robert McNamara,
the deposed empress of Iran, and the fashion designer Oscar de la Renta. Guests at his
60th birthday two years prior included five men he had once wiretapped. 492
Among this clique are some of the most powerful figures in American foreign
policy of the last two decades. Kissinger’s relationships with them has maintained his
reputation as an elder statesman and ensured his continued influence over the course of
U.S. foreign policy. His friendship with Hillary Clinton offers one such example.
In a primary debate, Clinton declared that she “was very flattered when Henry
Kissinger said I ran the State Department better than anybody had run it in a long
time.” 493 Perhaps to Clinton’s surprise, this invocation of Kissinger became controversial
in the primary, and brought renewed criticism of her foreign policy views and record. It
was, however, an honest expression of her relationship with her predecessor.
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In a highly positive review of Kissinger’s 2014 book World Order, Clinton
praises the work as “vintage Kissinger, with his singular combination of breadth and
acuity along with his knack for connecting headlines to trend lines” and calls Kissinger’s
writing “surprisingly idealistic.” 494 More importantly, she states that “Kissinger is a
friend, and I relied on his counsel when I served as secretary of state. He checked in with
me regularly, sharing astute observations about foreign leaders and sending me written
reports on his travels.” 495
This description of their relationship is borne out by leaked communications
between the two figures, in which Kissinger says to Clinton “I greatly admire the skill
and aplomb with which you conduct our foreign policy” and Clinton questions how her
relationship with then-President Barack Obama compares with that of Kissinger and
Nixon.496
This embrace of the hardcore realist Henry Kissinger may seem odd for Hillary
Clinton, a liberal internationalist and humanitarian interventionist who during the 2016
primaries was seeking to bolster her progressive credentials. But this is not the only
embrace of Kissinger by someone with these views, nor the most unlikely.
In 2014, Obama’s ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, attended a
baseball game with Kissinger, in part of what Grandin describes as “a ritual among our
political class to seek out Kissinger and engage in some form of public banter with
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him.” 497 This encounter was especially ironic given that Power’s elevation into the
foreign policy elite was in significant part the result of her book A Problem from Hell:
America and the Age of Genocide, which details at length Kissinger’s complicity in the
Khmer Rouge genocide in Cambodia and the mass killings of Kurds by Saddam Hussein
in Iraq, as well as his greenlighting of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. 498 Two
years later, Kissinger presented Power with the American Academy of Berlin’s Henry A.
Kissinger Prize. 499
As with Elliott Abrams, Kissinger’s career in foreign policy has been sustained by
his extensive personal relationships and institutional involvements. These naturally lead
to group solidarity for his benefit, as displayed by his reliable defenses from other
policymakers like Robert Blackwill, and from members of the commentariat like Robert
Kaplan and Niall Ferguson. 500
Kissinger’s treatment, however, demands more explanation. As meticulously
argued by Christopher Hitchens in his book The Trial of Henry Kissinger, Kissinger is a
man who could easily be tried and convicted for crimes against humanity if a court with
proper jurisdiction were to take up the case (in 2004, a federal court dismissed a civil
lawsuit against Kissinger by the family of a Chilean military officer murdered in the leadup to the 1973 coup on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction to litigate foreign
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policy decisions). 501 How, then, can so much of the foreign policy elite refuse to concede
the deleterious and immoral outcomes of so many of Kissinger’s policies?
Hints can be found in the words of Kissinger’s defenders. In his article In Defense
of Henry Kissinger, Robert Blackwill pushes back on the notion that Kissinger was
“complicit” in Pakistani atrocities in Bangladesh:
This issue of private U.S. admonitions versus public condemnations of other
governments is, of course, familiar. Similar questions have loomed over
America’s recent attempts to moderate political upheavals in friendly countries
such as Bahrain and Egypt (both with American-trained and -supplied armed
forces responding, at times brutally, to what they regarded as existential internal
crises). But these are policy dilemmas, not crimes. Under Bass’s definition of
“complicity” with atrocities, few practitioners of American foreign policy would
escape unindicted. 502
The problem with Blackwill’s argument is that it doesn’t so much prove that
Kissinger was not complicit in atrocities as it does suggest that other members of the U.S.
foreign policy elite have been complicit in atrocities as well. This is not a defense of
Kissinger but an indictment of U.S. foreign policy at large. This explains the vehemence
of Blackwill, Kaplan, and Kissinger’s other defenders. To accept the notion that
Kissinger was an immoral and sometimes ineffectual policymaker who helped get
millions killed and destabilized entire regions would undermine the elite’s key
conceptions of America’s role in the world.
This problem is highlighted by another quote from Clinton’s review of World
Order, regarding Kissinger:
Though we have often seen the world and some of our challenges quite
differently, and advocated different responses now and in the past, what comes
through clearly in this new book is a conviction that we, and President Obama,
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share: a belief in the indispensability of continued American leadership in service
of a just and liberal order. 503
This suggests another one of Putnam’s dimensions of elite integration: value
consensus. Kissinger and Clinton may disagree on the merits or morality of specific
policies, but they firmly agree on the premise that American hegemony must be
maintained to uphold a liberal world order. The issue with this premise is that the
imperatives of hegemony often contradict those of the liberal order, such as international
law.
In a column for The Week, Damon Linker asserts that members of the U.S.
foreign policy elite tend to hold two conflicting convictions. The first is that the United
States is “a righteous country” and that “our ends are noble, our principles pure, and
decent people everywhere benefit enormously from our leadership.” In this vein, “the
liberal international order that encourages rule-following and negotiation while fostering
peace and prosperity among nations is our handiwork.” 504 On the other hand, these elites
believe we must be “tough, ruthless, hard-nosed, realistic about the ugly ways of the
world,” and that “in such a world, the ends often justify the means.” 505
The contradiction of these two beliefs is exposed in Cambodia, for one example.
International law may prohibit bombing a neutral country, or dropping cluster munitions
on civilians. But Kissinger deemed these actions necessary for the end of maintaining
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American hegemony. In Cambodia, as in so many other cases, the demands of hegemony
were placed above the constraints of the liberal international order.
Yet many in the foreign policy community continue to hold these beliefs in
tandem. And when one believes both these things, Linker says, “a whole range of
wondrous things become possible, including magical thinking about the malleability of
the world and the capacity to evade responsibility for both morally treacherous behavior
and outright failure.” 506
One such wondrous thing that becomes possible under these conditions is the
career of Henry Kissinger. To accept Kissinger as a destructive force is to accept the
inherent conflict between American hegemony and liberal order. Most of the U.S. foreign
policy elite is deeply committed to the notion that these things are in fact mutually
dependent, and thus to his death Henry Kissinger will remain vaunted in America’s
highest circles, his reputation mostly intact.
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Conclusion
“In most professions, such a litany of errors would prompt a soul-searching. Heads
would roll. Schools of thought would close down.” – Edward Luce, Financial Times,
2018.

In his Financial Times column quoted above, Edward Luce argues that the
presidency of Donald Trump has helped launder the reputations of America’s foreign
policy elite. Despite the litany of errors this clique has broadly supported in the 21st
century – most notably the invasion of Iraq and the global War on Terror – they have
regained their esteem by defining themselves in opposition to Trump’s caustic and
reckless approach to foreign affairs. 507
This may well be true. In their campaigns for president, both Trump and his
predecessor, Barack Obama, to some extent ran against the foreign policy elite. In office,
Obama corrected against his own predecessor’s worst instincts, but failed to provide a
fully-articulated alternative model of foreign policy. Trump, for his part, rhetorically
repudiated the elite while relying on some of its worst members to staff his
administration, and generally conducting foreign policy with the incoherence,
belligerence, and self-interest with which he pursues all things.
But the impunity of the foreign policy elite predates Trump, Obama, and the Iraq
War. It has persisted through drastic changes in the geopolitical landscape, and with no
regard to which party controls the executive branch. The central aim of this paper has

507

Luce, “How Trump Laundered the US Foreign Policy Elite’s Reputation.”

120

been to explain why and how members of the foreign policy elite exist above
accountability for their actions – be it professional accountability for mistakes and policy
failures, or legal accountability for serious crimes.
Presented here are several different explanations for this phenomenon. First, there
are Robert Putnam’s “dimensions of elite integration,” including social homogeneity,
common patterns of recruitment, institutional context, extensive personal interaction,
group solidarity, and value consensus. These conditions, displayed prominently by the
U.S. foreign policy elite, have helped make that elite a self-perpetuating and selfinterested group that protects its members regardless of deed or merit. Each of these
factors (with the exception of social homogeneity, which would require empirical data
that is not currently available) can be demonstrated to have played a role in sustaining the
careers of two of the U.S. foreign policy elite’s most flagrantly destructive members,
Elliott Abrams and Henry Kissinger.
Furthermore, this elite resistance to accountability is enabled by a marginalized
and passive Congress, and a disengaged and persuadable public. But this examination has
raised almost as many questions as it has answered. For one, there is the question of
whether, or to what degree, this is inevitable. As mentioned in the introduction, Robert
Michels advanced the argument that in any organization that necessarily delegates
decisions to a bureaucratic leadership, that leadership will eventually, invariably, operate
as an oligarchy. There is also the realist perspective on state behavior, which posits that
states behave in whatever way maximizes their power in the international system. In this
paradigm, the broad contours of a state’s foreign policy are structurally determined, and
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thus the views and merits of individual policymakers, and whether those policymakers
are rewarded for success and punished for failures, are of marginal importance.
Total acceptance of this proposition would render this paper meaningless. But the
case studies included here, particularly that of Henry Kissinger, go a long way in
disproving it. Kissinger’s “geopolitical,” outlook, his most unique and salient feature as a
policymaker, led him to pursue the diplomatic opening to the People’s Republic of China
as well as to execute a secret and illegal bombing campaign of Cambodia for the sake of
American “credibility.” The first act is famous because it was bold and unexpected, and
went against the conventional wisdom of much of the Cold War foreign policy
establishment, seemingly revealing Kissinger’s diplomatic genius. The second is
infamous because it revealed his worst tendencies as a policymaker – depravity in service
of an obviously misguided rationale.
In short, individuals do matter in the creation of U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, it
matters how policymakers are selected into, promoted within, and removed from the
higher circles of the U.S. foreign policy community. In a well-functioning, meritocratic
elite, policymakers would rise with their policy successes and fall with policy failures. In
a more arbitrary and oligarchic elite, policymakers rise by virtue of reputation and
relationships, and rarely fall. When, as is the case for the U.S. foreign policy elite,
professional advancement is divorced from success or failure, a problem of moral hazard
appears.
In Twilight of the Elites, Christopher Hayes states that “a society in which
cheaters, shirkers, and incompetents face no sanction, where bad behavior meets reward,
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is a morally hazardous one.” 508 Here moral hazard describes “the perverse incentives that
can arise when agents are insulated from the cost of their actions.” 509 This is the problem
produced by the impunity of the foreign policy elite. If elite policymakers are confident
that they will not face consequences for abysmal failures of policy, or even for criminal
wrongdoings, they are encouraged to behave more recklessly. This initiates a positive
feedback cycle, as each case of impunity lowers the perceived consequences of such
recklessness. A future policymaker, having seen Henry Kissinger commit crimes against
humanity and policy disasters only to become America’s most celebrated elder statesman,
would at the very least not be disincentivized against acting in a similar way.
Ben Rhodes, former Deputy National Security Adviser to President Obama,
concurs:
“On a general level, the United States resists accountability for foreign policy
mistakes… there is a club-like element to the foreign policy establishment: when
people leave government, they often work at think tanks or in corporate positions
with other people who previously served in government, and then when the
revolving door turns – for instance, after an election – those people help one
another move back into government. The result, in my view, is a group think that
not only resists accountability for mistakes, but also condemns us too often to
repeating them.” 510
Another question raised by this paper that demands further study is that of the
legal impunity granted to members of the foreign policy elite. While a number of highlevel U.S. officials have faced prosecution for crimes like perjury or obstruction of justice
– though their actual punishments are often negligible – graver crimes, such as human
rights abuses, crimes against humanity, and violations of international law, uniformly go
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unpunished. This is attributable to a number of legal, social, and political factors that this
paper has not explored.
Among the legal obstacles to accountability is the refusal of U.S. courts to assert
jurisdiction over what they deem foreign policy decisions. This was demonstrated by a
2004 lawsuit against Henry Kissinger “filed against him by the family of a Chilean
military officer who was killed in an attempted kidnapping that Kissinger helped
organize.” 511 The judge asserted that “second-guessing the methods by which the
Executive Branch chose to deal with a new Socialist regime in Chile in the 1970s vis a
vis their effect on foreign citizens… is not the proper role of this court” and that “the
Court lacks judicially discoverable and manageable standards to resolve inherently
political questions.” 512
This last point – that crimes involving “inherently political questions” cannot be
punished – is regularly trotted out in defense of elite impunity. When Scooter Libby, an
aide to Vice President Dick Cheney, was prosecuted for perjury and obstruction of
justice, Richard Cohen of the Washington Post wrote in his defense, saying that
government officials should not be held to “account for practicing the dark art of
politics.” 513 Conversely, in 2007, MSNBC host Chris Matthews dismissed the idea that
the Democratic Congress should initiate investigations into potential criminal
wrongdoing in the Bush White House, suggesting such investigations “would be
perceived as politics.” 514 Thus, with a Kafkaesque twist of logic, crimes committed by
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policymakers are “politics” and should therefore be tolerated, while investigations into
those crimes would be “politics” and are therefore intolerable.
Lastly, there are nebulous social factors operating against accountability for the
foreign policy elite. In his article “The Case Against Henry Kissinger,” Christopher
Hitchens wrote, “The United States believes that it alone pursues and indicts war
criminals and ‘international terrorists’; nothing in its political or journalistic culture yet
allows for the thought that it might be harboring and sheltering such a senior one.” 515
What Hitchens is describing is a political culture in which elites are extremely hesitant to
describe U.S. officials as war criminals, even if their actions plainly meet the legal
definition of war crimes. If elite politicians and journalists refuse to acknowledge that
U.S. officials can even be war criminals, it is almost impossible to build public support
for war crimes trials against them. Such a political culture is the product of complex
social factors that this paper does not fully address. Like the other political and legal
obstacles to accountability for elite crimes, this demands further examination.

A Bipartisan Problem
The two figures examined in the case studies happen to be, despite heterodox
politics in their early lives, Republicans who performed the vast majority of their
government service in Republican administrations. This is not to suggest that Republican
policymakers alone are guilty of policy failures or crimes in office, nor that they are
unique in being unaccountable for such acts. It may be the case, as the Republican Party
since the Second World War has largely been the party of aggressive foreign policy, that
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Republican policymakers tend to lay claim to the most egregious acts in the annals of
U.S. foreign affairs. Democrats, however, have their share of blame for the impunity of
the foreign policy elite, and some prominent Democratic policymakers have benefited
from this impunity.
In some cases, Democratic administrations have perpetuated this lack of
accountability by failing to investigate serious potential wrongdoings that occurred under
their predecessors. During his 1992 campaign against George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton
“argued that there was serious wrongdoing requiring urgent investigation and possibly
prosecution,” regarding both the Iran-Contra affair and another scandal called “Iraqgate”
in which Bush and Reagan officials were alleged to have “secretly and illegally supplied
Saddam Hussein with large amounts of money, weapons technology, training, military
intelligence, and even nuclear components.” 516 Once in office, however, Clinton failed to
conduct serious investigations into these issues and even “took steps to suppress any real
inquiries into Iraqgate.” 517 The administration justified this on the grounds that it wanted
to look forward instead of backwards, and because such investigations could potentially
undermine the support of congressional Republicans for other presidential initiatives.
Similarly, during his own campaign for president in 2008, Barack Obama
declared his intention to investigate possible crimes related to the George W. Bush
administration’s illegal mass surveillance and torture programs. 518 Like Clinton,
however, Obama reversed himself after his election. His administration failed to
investigate or prosecute Bush officials, “despite considerable evidence that President
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Bush and Vice President Cheney authorized torture” in violation of U.S. and international
law. 519 This decision, Stephen Walt says, “makes future recurrences more likely and casts
doubt on America’s professed commitment to defend human rights and the rule of
law.” 520
Additionally, prominent Democratic foreign policy stalwarts have created their
own share of policy disasters and atrocities. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security
Adviser to President Jimmy Carter who is often portrayed as Kissinger’s principal
Democratic rival and counterpart, failed to anticipate the 1979 Iranian Revolution that
overthrew the U.S.-backed Shah. 521 He sought, unsuccessfully, to forestall the revolution
“by instigating a military coup in Tehran,” which, had it been attempted and failed, could
have made the Shah’s overthrow even more of a disaster for the U.S. 522 Brzezinski
subsequently chose to “deepen” and “overtly militarize” U.S. involvement around the
Persian Gulf. 523 Among other things, this helped create the conditions that would lead to
the first and second Gulf Wars, and by placing U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, helped
inspire Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden to attack the United States. 524
During the Clinton administration, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and UN
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke were both instrumental in promoting and implementing
the international sanctions regime against Iraq that was intended to force Saddam Hussein
into complying with UN resolutions on weapons of mass destruction, and to contain his
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military capacity. 525 The sanctions regime could be considered successful in that Iraq’s
military was weakened and Hussein did not develop weapons of mass destruction, but it
failed to achieve Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions. More importantly, the economic
devastation and deprivation caused by the sanctions killed an estimated 500,000 Iraqi
children, to which Albright famously said, “we think the price is worth it.” 526
Madeleine Albright remains a Democratic foreign policy mandarin up to today,
and a fixture of the Washington think tank world, as did Holbrooke and Brzezinski up to
their deaths in 2010 and 2017, respectively. 527 In fairness, Albright’s glib remark about
the deaths of Iraqi children was something of an aberration; she has since consistently
spoken of the issue with much more nuance and gravity. 528 Furthermore, each of these
officials has meaningful accomplishments to his or her name: for Brzezinski, the Panama
Canal Treaty, the Camp David Accords, and improved relations for China, for
Holbrooke, the Dayton Accords that ended the Yugoslav War, and for Albright, the
resolution of the Kosovo Crisis. 529 But each was also responsible for significant disasters
and even atrocities for which they indisputably have not faced meaningful consequences.
Likewise, the Clinton and Obama administrations also indulged in the habit of
staffing foreign policy positions with officials with dismal policy records. For his team to
manage the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Clinton selected three officials who had
worked on this issue for the first Bush administration – Dennis Ross, Aaron David Miller,
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and Daniel Kurtzer – whom Walt faults for failing to “halt Israeli settlement construction
or begin direct talks for a formal peace deal.” 530 With the addition of Martin Indyk and
Robert Malley, Clinton’s own team was “responsible for the fruitless effort to achieve a
final status agreement between 1993 and 2000.” 531
Despite this, Ross was hired by Obama’s 2008 campaign and then joined the
National Security Council in Obama first term. In this position, he clashed with other
Obama officials over the Israel-Palestine issue, and expressed doubts that a nuclear
agreement could be reached with Iran – a measure that was successfully concluded only
after he left the administration. 532 In 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry chose Martin
Indyk to head an effort at reviving the peace process, which failed. One Clinton official
who was not brought back to work on Israel-Palestine was Robert Malley, who had been
“the most skeptical of the traditional U.S. approach to the issue.” 533
The Obama administration’s most flagrant embrace of impunity for the foreign
policy elite was demonstrated by its choice of intelligence officials. Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper told Congress in 2013 that “the NSA was not willingly
collecting data on U.S. citizens.” 534 This was revealed to be false by Edward Snowden’s
whistleblowing, and Clapper admitted as much, effectively confessing to the crime of
lying to Congress. The Obama administration chose to protect Clapper, with the president
declaring that he had “full confidence” in him. 535
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Former CIA director John Brennan received similar treatment from the Obama
administration. He joined the White House staff in 2009 because the administration
believed that his past involvement in Bush’s interrogation and detention programs would
make the Senate unlikely to confirm him as CIA director. On the White House staff, he
was in charge of the administration’s so-called “kill list” targeting individuals for drone
strikes. In this role he defended the drone strike policy, claiming in 2011 that “for nearly
the past year there hasn’t been a single collateral death” from such strikes. Credible
evidence suggested he was lying, as just three months before that statement, a drone
strike had killed 42 people at a tribal meeting in Pakistan. 536
Despite this deceit, Brennan was appointed and confirmed to the post of CIA
director in 2013. Later, the CIA under Brennan was revealed to be spying on
congressional staffers who were investigating the Bush era torture and detention
programs. Brennan denied that this had occurred until the CIA’s inspector general
confirmed it, but the Obama administration maintained its “full confidence” in him.
Thus, while the Republican Party may boast the most flagrant exemplars of
impunity in the foreign policy elite, there are certainly more than a few prominent
Democratic members of the elite who also fit this mold, and Democratic political leaders
have shown little will to address this lack of accountability.

The Opinion-makers
The role of opinion-makers and media figures in protecting members of the
foreign policy elite against accountability has come up numerous times in this paper.
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Prominent opinion leaders seem to reflexively leap to the defense of members of the
foreign policy elite, shielding them against questions on their competence, the success of
their policy records, or their morals. These opinion-makers are often eager to let the
public know of their friendships with the policymakers they are defending, and seem to
view their personal relationships with these powerful people as a testament to their
credibility and not a conflict of interest.
In one particularly ridiculous example, Richard Cohen of the Washington Post
expresses his pleasure at seeing Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense in the
Reagan administration, pardoned by George H.W. Bush before he was set to go to trial
for perjury and obstruction of justice. 537 Cohen bases his support of Weinberger’s pardon
at least in part on the fact that the two men had enjoyed friendly social encounters at a
Safeway grocery store: “based on my Safeway encounters, I came to think of Weinberger
as a basic sort of guy, candid and no nonsense – which is the way much of official
Washington saw him. Cap, my Safeway buddy, walks, and that’s all right with me.” 538
What Weinberger’s personality, or his habit of shopping for his own groceries, has to do
with his guilt or innocence is not clear.
Additionally, media positions offer soft landings for former government officials,
even those who should be thoroughly discredited. As Ben Rhodes describes, “our
media… for reasons I’ve never really understood, offers platforms like newspaper
columns and television slots to people based on their government service; sometimes, in a
quest for “balance,” they’ll hire people simply because of the position they held in the
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Administration of a particular party.” 539 This phenomenon often enables failed
policymakers to continue to influence U.S. policy discourse, and to advance the same
ideas that they implemented while in government. It also gives them a platform to defend
their friends and former colleagues who may still be in policymaking.
Beyond serving as guardians of elite impunity, opinion-makers in the foreign
policy world benefit from a similar lack of accountability. Instead, prominent pundits and
media figures are able to advocate one disastrous policy after another without seeing any
impact on their careers; in many cases, they continue to advance upwards.
This was well-illustrated by the Iraq War. In the months preceding the invasion,
both the New York Times and Washington Post published false stories supporting the
Bush administration’s narrative on Iraq’s fictional WMD program. 540 Individual
journalists such as Jeffrey Goldberg also played a prominent role, as Goldberg wrote a
“lengthy article” for The New Yorker “describing supposed links between Osama bin
Laden and the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.” 541 These “links” also turned out to be
fictitious, but Goldberg was nonetheless promoted to become editor-in-chief of The
Atlantic in 2016. 542
The Washington Post offers an especially flagrant example of impunity in media.
Under the leadership of Fred Hiatt in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, the Post editorial
board ran “twenty seven separate editorials advocating the war.” 543 In the decade-plus
since the Iraq War began, most of these writers who hyped up the war have held onto
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their positions at the Post, despite continuing to be severely wrong about other foreign
policy issues. 544
Moreover, the Post’s leadership has seen no reason to significantly diversify its
editorial page to include more who opposed the war or correctly guessed that it would be
a disaster. A 2018 study by the media watchdog group FAIR found that “Of the 23
current staff columnists who had a clear opinion on the Iraq War either before or in the
aftermath of the invasion, 21 supported it.” 545 Of the Post’s 46 staff columnists in 2018,
three had actually worked for the Bush administration, meaning that the Post has more
columnists who were employed by the administration than opposed its invasion of
Iraq. 546
In February 2018, the Washington Post saw fit to add to its stable of pro-Iraq War
columnists by hiring the neoconservative writer Max Boot. Boot, like many
neoconservatives, is a member of the “Never Trump” movement, a group that mostly
exists in political magazines and on the opinion pages of America’s elite newspapers. 547
The same year he was hired by the Post, Boot published a book entitled The Corrosion of
Conservatism: Why I Left the Right. The book, according to a review by Peter Maass of
The Intercept, mostly consists of Boot “apologizing for nearly everything he has done
and abided.” 548 This includes the Iraq War, which he calls “a chastening lesson on the
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limits of American power.” 549 It is unclear, however, just how chastened Max Boot is. In
a January 2019, Boot used his new column in the Washington Post to advocate that the
U.S. should drop any pretenses of seeking victory in Iraq and Syria, but leave its troops
deployed there. These conflicts, he said, should be viewed as open-ended engagements
that may take decades or even centuries to resolve. In a tweet accompanying the article,
he wrote:
“We need to think of these deployments in much the same way as we thought of
our Indian Wars, which lasted roughly 300 years, or as the British thought about
their deployment on the North West Frontier, which lasted 100 years. U.S. troops
are policing the frontiers of the Pax Americana.” 550
After many on Twitter took issue with the seemingly favorable comparison to a
genocidal war, Boot blessed Washington Post readers with another insightful column,
this one entitled, “On Wednesday, the Twitter Mob Came for Me.” 551
In The Corrosion of Conservatism, Boot laments that some of his left-wing critics
will never accept his mea culpa, and instead demand his “ritual suicide.” 552 With this
hyperbole, Boot casts accountability in the media as a ridiculous proposition. But his
actual critics propose more measured consequences. Maass, for his part, suggests that
Boot follow the lead of Paul Bremer, who, a few years after his disastrous tenure as
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civilian overseer of the American occupation in Iraq, took up painting and moved to
Vermont to become a ski instructor. 553
Boot’s case is not an exception among U.S. media figures, nor is he the most
prominent example of a pundit failing upwards. Thomas Friedman, longtime political
columnist for the New York Times, is among the most chronically incorrect men in the
American media. Friedman is famous for his reliance on blunt and inaccurate cultural
stereotypes, worn clichés like the cab driver conversation, and inscrutable mixed
metaphors. 554 See, for example, a 2014 column entitled “Playing Hockey with Putin,” in
which Friedman writes:
Shortly before the Sochi Olympics, Russian President Vladimir Putin played in an
exhibition hockey game there. In retrospect, he was clearly warming up for his
takeover of Crimea. Putin doesn't strike me as a chess player, in geopolitical
terms. He prefers hockey, without a referee, so elbowing, tripping and crosschecking are all permitted. Never go to a hockey game with Putin and expect to
play by the rules of touch football. The struggle over Ukraine is a hockey game,
with no referee. If we're going to play—we, the Europeans and the pro-Western
Ukrainians need to be serious. 555
Friedman has not always felt this way about Vladimir Putin; in 2001, he advised
readers to “keep rootin’ for Putin,” calling him “Russia’s first Deng Xiaoping.” 556 This
pattern – an assessment that turns out to be wildly incorrect, followed by a glib reversal
years later – is common in Friedman’s work. In an interview with Motherboard,
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journalist Belen Fernandez detailed how in 2003, Friedman went from saying that the
Iraq War was partly about oil, to claiming that only apologists for Saddam Hussein
thought the war was about oil, to blaming the war on Americans who drive gas-guzzling
SUVs, all in the span of about a year. 557
Friedman’s most famous statement on Iraq, however, came in a 2003 interview
with Charlie Rose, when he explained that the purpose of the Iraq War was to teach some
kind of cultural lesson, not to Iraq specifically, but to Muslims and Middle Easterners in
general:
What they needed to see was American boys and girls going house to house, from
Basra to Baghdad, and basically saying: ‘Which part of this sentence don’t you
understand? You don’t think, you know, we care about our open society, you
think this bubble fantasy, we’re just gonna to let it grow? Well, Suck. On. This.’
That, Charlie, is what this war is about. We could have hit Saudi Arabia; it was
part of that bubble. Could have hit Pakistan. We hit Iraq because we could. 558
More recently, Friedman raised eyebrows with his cheerleading of the Saudi
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Friedman hyped the crown prince as a religious
reformer and social modernizer in a column entitled “Saudi Arabia’s Arab Spring, At
Last.” 559 Less than a year later, the Saudi writer Jamal Khashoggi, a moderate critic of
the regime, was murdered and butchered in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, most likely
on the orders of the crown prince himself. 560 Friedman expressed horror at Khashoggi’s
murder, and skepticism that it could have occurred without the crown prince’s approval.
But he defended his prior enthusiasm for Prince Mohammed with characteristic glibness:
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“I always knew that M.B.S.’s reform agenda was a long shot to succeed, but I was
rooting for its success… It had nothing to do with M.B.S. personally. Personally, I don’t
care if Saudi Arabia is ruled by M.B.S., S.O.S. or K.F.C.” 561 He followed this up by
asserting that America’s greatest national interest in the Islamic world is “Islamic
religious reform, which can come only from Saudi Arabia, the home of Islam’s holiest
cities, Mecca and Medina.” The necessity of such reform aside, the notion that it could
only come from Saudi Arabia would be absurd to anyone with a basic knowledge of the
histories of Islam or Saudi Arabia.
Based on this record, it is unsurprising that Friedman is the subject of much
derision in his own field. The late writer Alexander Cockburn called him “the silliest man
on the planet.” 562 A whole cottage industry has sprung up around deconstructing and
mocking Friedman’s latest columns and his writing style, displayed in semi-regular
round-ups by the Columbia Journalism Review. 563 In 2013, Daniel Drezner, a figure well
within the mainstream, centrist foreign policy elite, wrote an “open letter” to the New
York Times in which he asserted that a recent Friedman column had “migrated from the
merely foolish to the ill-considered and dangerous” and said that “Friedman clearly needs
a sabbatical from the rigors of column-writing to get his head back in the game.” 564
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Drezner ended his letter with a plea to the Times: “in the interest of raising our country’s
foreign policy discourse, I beg you to put him on leave.” 565
Yet Friedman retains one of the most prestigious political writing posts in the
United States, with a massive platform to inform the public on foreign policy issues. As
for the U.S. (and global) political and economic elite, Friedman still commands, if not
their respect, at least their frequent attention. He is a regular speaker at the World
Economic Forum in Davos, and in 2014, he was granted a rare hour-long sit down
interview with then-President Obama. 566
Unlike men such as Elliott Abrams and Henry Kissinger, nothing in Friedman’s
record can plausibly be described as criminal, and he certainly does not bear direct
responsibility for anyone’s death (at least, from what information is publicly available).
But his career starkly demonstrates the lack of professional accountability among foreign
policy opinion-makers; no matter how many times his prognostications prove wildly
wrong, no matter how many times and by how many people his columns are exposed as
ridiculous, he retains his enviable post, and with it the ear of some of the world’s most
powerful people.

Solutions
The problems set forth in this paper clearly demand a response. The challenge,
however, is figuring out exactly how to address the complex cultural, political, and
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economic factors that sustain elite impunity. The foreign policy elite is spread across
numerous institutions, both private and public, so no simple mechanism or rule change
can be put in place to facilitate accountability. Instead, what is needed is a broad, multifaceted effort to make both structural changes in the realm of policymaking, and cultural
changes that extend to the private sector. Due to various factors, including the necessity
for secrecy in some policymaking and the importance that policymakers be given leeway
to take reasonable risks, creating conditions in which the foreign policy elite is perfectly
accountable will not be possible. However, it can be moved in the right direction, and the
worst instances of impunity can be mitigated.
The simplest institutional fixes to bring accountability to foreign policy making
would involve restoring Congressional authority and oversight over foreign policy. This
can come in a number of ways. Congress, as described in the second chapter, has the sole
constitutional power to declare war. In theory, this should mean that Congress has to give
its approval when American forces are deployed into a new country in a new conflict
against a new enemy. For almost two decades, however, the Authorization for the Use of
Military Force, originally passed to allow the president to pursue the perpetrators of the
9/11 attacks, has acted a vehicle for unrestricted expansion of the War on Terror, as under
its authority presidents of both parties have deployed troops and air forces in numerous
countries and against new adversaries without a congressional vote, or in some cases,
without congressional or public knowledge. This raises the likelihood that executive
branch officials will be able to take overly risky or destructive actions while helping to
remove national security issues from the public debate. Congress could repeal the AUMF
and replace it with a new authorization that defines which foreign militant groups
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actually necessitate the use of American military force, limits the geographical scope of
the War on Terror, and includes sunset clauses so that it does not permanently delegate
war-making power to the presidency. This would ensure that the ongoing necessity of the
War on Terror would at least periodically be a point of public debate, and not fade into
the background.
Congress can also make use of its authority under the War Powers Act of 1973
and pass resolutions to end U.S. involvement in military conflicts which it opposes. 567 In
2019, Congress attempted to do this for the first time in the Act’s history with a
resolution to end U.S. military support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen. The resolution
was vetoed by President Trump and thus did not extricate the U.S. from the conflict, but
did send a powerful message reasserting the voice of congress in foreign affairs. 568
Additionally, both houses of Congress can act to build their diminished capacity
in foreign affairs by increasing the staff budgets of their foreign policy-focused
committees. 569 Congress could also establish a research body to gather information and
help educate members on matters of foreign relations, a role similar to that played by
Congressional Budget Office for budgetary issues. Both of these steps would make
Congress better equipped to address questions of foreign policy and challenge the
president and his officials when necessary.
Another institution that needs to be reformed if foreign policymakers are to be
held more accountable is the National Security Council. Since the NSC’s creation, it has
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been used by presidents, especially after Nixon, to concentrate foreign policy formulation
in the White House, away from oversight by Congress, and it has grown in size with each
successive administration. 570 The NSC has also become a tool for presidents to bring
officials with controversial or ignominious records into their administrations without
congressional approval. 571 In some cases, however, the extra secrecy afforded by the
NSC has been used to positive ends, as it was during the Obama administration’s efforts
to restore diplomatic relations with Cuba. 572 Congress should therefore look to rein in the
role of the Council or gain some oversight on its personnel and activities without totally
foreclosing its more advantageous uses. To do so, Congress could amend the 1947
National Security Act to reduce the size and budget of the Council, and force more policy
decisions back into the Departments of State and Defense. Alternatively, Congress could
amend the National Security Act to require Senate confirmation for top NSC officials. 573
The latter act especially could ensure that the Council is not used as a tool of impunity to
bring discredited policymakers back into government, as it was with Elliott Abrams or
more recently, with Michael Flynn.
Congress, however, is most responsive to political demands, and is therefore
unlikely to take up this cause on its own. Furthermore, private institutions that fuel elite
impunity, like think tanks and the media, would not be affected by any of these changes.
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In order to push Congress to act, and to encourage such private entities to embrace
accountability, a great deal of public pressure would be required.
Theoretically, a broad social movement could take shape to demand an end to
elite impunity, pressuring Congress to conduct more diligent and critical oversight of
foreign policy officials, and even pressuring think tanks and media organizations to let go
of discredited figures like Thomas Friedman, or at least to balance those figures with
fresh, critical voices and different perspectives on foreign policy. Such an effort could
follow the mold of successful pro-democracy and anti-corruption movements in other
countries, such as Otpor! in Serbia.
Truth be told, it is hard to see this succeeding, or even being strongly attempted,
in the United States. Such pressure is unlikely to come from a public as disengaged from
foreign affairs as Americans are. Furthermore, polarization makes accountability more
politicized, as segments of the public are inclined to rally behind elites whom they
perceive to be on their side; one need only look to how after the Iran-Contra scandal
revealed his extensive criminal activities, Oliver North became a cause célèbre of the
American right. If the invasion of Iraq and the disastrous occupation that followed were
not enough to create a massive public backlash against the foreign policy elite, it is
difficult to imagine what would.
In reality, any effort to make members of the foreign policy officials more
accountable could only occur in the context of a broader national dialogue about the
deep-rooted problems in America’s foreign policy direction since the Second World War.
The story of the foreign policy elite is not simply one of individuals making grave errors
because they are incompetent or immoral, though that is certainly a factor in some cases.
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The reason that this elite seems to constantly produce failed and criminal policies is that
it is pursuing two inherently contradictory objectives that its members almost uniformly
insist are in fact mutually dependent: American global hegemony and a liberal
international order.
Led by willing and able members of the political elite, the American public can
reckon with this contradiction and the specific disasters it has produced. Such a dialogue
could determine whether the United States will seek a more humble foreign policy and
accept the constraints of the liberal international order it claims to uphold, or drop the
pretenses of this order in pursuit of power and national interest. In the former case,
instances of grave failure or crime requiring consequences would hopefully be reduced;
in the latter, by dropping the veneers of legalism and moral authority, impunity could be
openly embraced and justified by reason of state.
Such an extensive democratic re-evaluation of a nation’s foreign policy would be
unprecedented in human history. For that reason it may be considered unlikely to
succeed. At least one current presidential candidate, however, has hinted at trying to start
something like this. 574 Its prospects may be slim, but if the United States is to have a
foreign policy elite that is both more effective and more accountable, it must at least be
tried.
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